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An important issue that China faces as its economy gradually moves from one that is 
based on central planning to one in which resource allocation is determined to a great 
extent through the market mechanism, is what role the market mechanism should be 
allowed to play in the health care sector. The three essays in this thesis address different 
aspects of this question. In essay 1, on Physician Dual Practice, the effects of allowing 
physicians employed in government hospitals to practice privately are analyzed, while 
essay 2, on Health Financing Reform and Fiscal Decentralization, considers the question 
whether it is likely that local governments in China will allow private insurance plan to 
compete on equal terms with the publicly-sponsored social insurance plans. Essay 3, 
Health System Reform in China: An Assessment of Recent Trends, provides general 
background on recent trends in Chinese health care policy, and raises the question to 
whether an expanded role for markets and the private sector might have a useful role in 
China’s future health care system. 
 
Chapter 1: Physician Dual Practice 
It is a common phenomenon in many countries that physicians employed in public 
hospitals also work in private clinics. In the literature, physician dual practice is argued to 
be a self selection mechanism in terms of quality and morality. In other words, hospital 
physicians with high quality or low morality are more likely to have private practice. In 
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some developing countries, dual practice is also considered as an informal way to 
compensate public hospital physicians whose salary is relatively low. However, physician 
dual practice remains a controversial issue since physicians may take advantage of 
hospital resources for their own interests. For the health authority in a county or city, 
whether to allow physician dual practice is certainly an important policy concern. 
In this paper, we consider the question whether dual practice should be allowed in the 
context of the policy objective that patients should receive their care in the treatment 
setting that is most efficient. Hence, the focus of the paper is on patient heterogeneity and 
differences in the cost of care in a hospital and an outpatient setting, depending on the 
nature of the patient’s illness. In an environment in which there is information asymmetry 
between doctors, on the one hand, and patients and health authority on the other hand, we 
analyze equilibria in which doctors have an incentive to exploit their information 
advantage over patients and their health authority to increase their net income. We show 
that, in general, such equilibria will not be economically efficient in the sense that doctors 
will not have an incentive to refer patients to the most efficient place of treatment. 
However we find that under some conditions, allowing dual practice can lead to a 
second-best improvement in efficiency, compared with a situation in which dual practice 
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Chapter 2: Health Financing Reform and Fiscal Decentralization in China 
Responsibility for many kinds of government programmes in China, including subsidies 
to health insurance and provision of health services, have been delegated to county and 
city governments which have considerable flexibility in the way they manage the local 
insurance and health services markets. Under current Chinese fiscal system, local 
officials also have strong incentives to raise funds for local investment. They may do so 
in a way that minimizes the net amount of money they have to spend on health care.  
In this paper we investigate how local government’s responses to such incentives can 
influence the effects of central government subsidies and regulations on the health care 
system.  
We use a model to study local government’s responses to central government’s policies 
in health reform since the late 1990’s, particularly, policies involving the establishment of 
a social health insurance system and hospital reform. Consistent with the context of the 
Chinese fiscal system at present, in our model, local government’s objective is to 
maximize revenue. Therefore, this model is rather in the spirit of public choice literature 
than the traditional public finance literature. 
The prediction from our study is that current reform policy would increase local 
governments’ incentive to increase enrollment in the social insurance plans, which they 
could do either by raising the quality of their coverage, or by taking measures to restrict 
competition from private insurance plans. In extreme cases, the prediction may be for 
policies so restrictive that private insurance would essentially be excluded from local 
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markets. Implication from our study is that national government must allow for such 
effects when designing health policies at the central level. 
 
Chapter 3: Health System Reform In China: An Assessment of Recent Trends 
With Åke Blomqvist 
In this paper, we first briefly review the changes that the Chinese health care system has 
undergone since the early 1980s. We then describe the major current health policy 
initiatives in urban and rural areas and discuss likely scenarios for their evolution over 
time. Using comparisons with international experience regarding different institutional 
arrangements in the health care sector, we also discuss whether the approaches taken in 
China are likely to strengthen the health care system in terms of efficiency and equity. 
Our conclusion is that in order to predict how effectively China's future health care 
system will perform in the future, one must have more information about what role the 
state (central government) will play, as regulator, partial funder and direct provider in the 
system. We believe that the best strategy at present is to allow the development of a 
mixed model with significant roles for both the state and the private sector, in both the 
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Chapter 1: Physician Dual Practice 
Section 1: Introduction: 
A central issue in much of the health economics literature is that of information 
asymmetry. Much of the literature on this issue focuses on the interaction between 
doctors and patients in a primary-care (outpatient) setting in which the doctor is paid via 
fee-for-service and hence is likely to have an incentive to provide (and charge for) a large 
volume of services to each patient. As a result of the information asymmetry between 
patients and doctors, patients typically have to rely on their doctors’ advice in deciding 
on the type of services to purchase. In this situation, the result of the information 
asymmetry may be supplier-induced demand, i.e., an outcome in which patients utilize, 
and pay for, a larger volume of services than they would have done if they had been 
better informed. 
 
Doctor-patient information asymmetry can also lead to supplier-induced demand on the 
part of specialist doctors who supply secondary and tertiary care, and who may treat 
inpatients as well as outpatients. In many countries, however, supplier-induced demand is 
not a relevant issue in the case of hospital-based doctors, because such doctors are paid 
on the basis of a fixed salary and hence have no incentive to induce patients to utilize 
more services than they would if they were fully informed. However, in the case of 
hospital-based salaried doctors another type of information asymmetry may be relevant, 
namely that between the doctors who provide services to patients and the hospital 
managers who employ them, and whose financial results or promotion prospects may 
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depend on the type and volume of services the hospital produces. Although hospital 
managers may be knowledgeable about medical conditions and the technologies available 
for treating patients, the nature of health care can make it difficult for managers to closely 
monitor the illness condition of individual patients, and the nature of the treatment that 
doctors provide. The result of this type of information asymmetry may be that doctors 
shirk (that is, spend less time and effort in treating patients than they would if they had a 
stronger incentive to provide more and higher-quality care). 
 
In many countries where salaried doctors treat patients in government hospitals, patients 
also have the option of seeking care in private hospitals or outpatient clinics instead. 
When privately provided care is supplied on the basis of fee for service, doctors who 
practice privately have a stronger incentive to provide care of high quality than salaried 
doctors in government hospitals, since their reputation for providing high-quality care is 
likely to influence the future demand for their services and hence increase their expected 
net income. In contrast, the income of salaried doctors in government hospitals does not 
depend directly on the volume of services they supply, and hence is less dependent on an 
individual doctor’s reputation for providing high-quality care. In such cases, a tendency 
may arise for the best doctors to gravitate toward private practice, leaving less 
experienced or talented doctors in the government hospitals. 
 
One way of overcoming this problem is to allow “dual practice”, that is, to allow salaried 
doctors in government hospitals to also practice privately on a part-time basis. In some 
                                                                                              11 
 
countries, specialist doctors in dual practice may actually treat their patients in designated 
beds in the government hospitals, although a more common arrangement is for them to 
treat private patients in their own outpatient clinics. By allowing dual practice, hospital 
managers hope to be able to retain experienced doctors capable of providing high-quality 
service in government hospitals so as to avoid the tendency for such doctors to leave the 
hospitals for full-time private practice. 
 
Arrangements to allow dual practice are often controversial. One reason is that additional 
monitoring may be required to ensure that salaried part-time employees actually fulfill 
their contracted working hours in the government hospital (and do not spend some of the 
time that they are supposed to be in the hospital in private practice instead). In India, for 
example, dual practice is one of the major reasons for a large scale of absence of health 
workers in public hospitals (Singh 2008, Yip and Mahal 2008). This may be particularly 
relevant in cases when doctors in dual practice can send patients who have been 
diagnosed in the hospital to their private clinics for treatment. Another reason why dual 
practice is controversial is that it often exists in situations where there is an excess 
demand and hence lengthy waiting lists for subsidized treatment in government hospitals, 
and private practice offers persons with high income an opportunity to bypass the waiting 
lists by paying for unsubsidized private care. This outcome is regarded as undesirable in 
countries such as Canada where there is an ideological commitment to the principle that 
all citizens should receive health care on similar terms, regardless of their income. At the 
same time, however, it is argued that dual practice can be advantageous because it has the 
indirect effect of shortening the waiting lists for subsidized care, or because it raises the 
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average quality of the care provided in government hospitals as it reduces the incentives 
for skilled practitioners to switch to full-time private practice, as noted above.  
 
In China today, dual practice is not a significant policy issue since private practice for 
doctors is uncommon, and doctors who work in government hospitals are only recently 
allowed to practice privately on the side. However, private practice may become more 
common as more and more doctors graduate from medical schools and regulators take a 
more positive view of private investment in clinics and hospitals. Thus the issue may 
become more important relatively soon. 
 
In this paper, we consider the question of whether dual practice should be allowed in the 
context of another policy objective in the health care system: patients should receive their 
care in the treatment setting that is efficient for them. Thus the focus in the paper is on 
patient heterogeneity and differences in the cost of care in a hospital and an outpatient 
setting, depending on the patient’s illness condition. In an environment in which there is 
information asymmetry between doctors and patients on the one hand, and doctors and 
hospital managers/local health authority on the other hand, we analyze equilibria in 
which doctors have an incentive to exploit their information advantage over patients and 
managers to increase their net income (utility). We show that in general, such equilibria 
will not be economically efficient in the sense that doctors will not have an incentive to 
refer patients to the most efficient place of treatment. However we find that under some 
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conditions, allowing dual practice can lead to a second-best improvement in efficiency, 
compared with a situation in which dual practice is not allowed. 
 
1.1: Literature review: 
A general survey on interaction between informal and formal activities in health sector is 
provided by Ensor and Thompson (2006). García-Prado and González (2007) review the 
variety of policies which government can make responding to physician dual practice. 
Jan, et al., (2005) is a survey on various regulations of physician dual practices and 
welfare impacts in several developing countries. In a more general context, Wolinsky 
(1993) studies different equilibriums for informed experts’ services when buyers can 
search for the services they need. In Wolinsky (1993), experts may choose to specialize 
in different level of services. 
 
There is a relatively small and recent literature on physician dual practice. Eggleston and 
Bir (2006) is a very good survey on dual practice literature. Assuming heterogeneous 
physicians, Bir and Eggleston (2003) argue that higher skilled physicians are more likely 
to stay in public hospitals when they can have additional income from private practice. 
Then, social welfare sometimes could be improved if dual practice is allowed. Biglaiser 
and Ma (2007) evaluate welfare effects with heterogeneous physician’s morality: 
moonlighters who shirk and provide poor quality treatment in hospital and non-
moonlighters who unselfishly provide good quality service in hospital. In their paper, 
since quality in private sector is assumed to be audited by regulators more effectively, 
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social welfare will always be improved with dual practice since moonlighters will 
provide higher quality service in private sector. 
 
Assuming that the reputation from practicing in public sector has effects on the demand 
for the services of a given physician in the private sector, González (2004) argues that 
dual practice may improve social welfare since physicians have incentives to provide 
quality services in hospital to enhance their reputation, given a carefully designed set of 
hospital regulations. In another paper, González (2005) discusses the negative effects of 
cream skimming behavior1 in dual practice when physicians follow a policy of 
transferring patients from hospital to their private clinics. Iverson (1997) constructs a 
model in which waiting time in hospital would be longer after allowing physician dual 
practice. Jack (1999) argues there are economies of scope for dual practice on both 
private and public sectors since working in one sector would increase productivity in the 
other. Moreover, although the salary in a hospital may be lower than income from private 
clinics, for a risk-averse physician who cannot access a well-functioning insurance 
market, working in both sectors may provide some degree of implicit insurance.  
 
Most literature observes that with dual practice, a physician has an incentive to divert 
patients from public hospital to his clinic to increase income. Most studies reach the 
conclusion that dual practice will sometimes improve social welfare compared to the 
regime disallowing dual practice.  
                                                            
1 Cream skimming is defined as the situation that physicians divert more profitable patients on the hospital waiting list 
to their private practice (Barros and Olivella, 2005, González, 2005). 
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In this paper, we focus on how physician dual practice can be useful to match treatment 
location and different types of illnesses under an environment where information is 
asymmetric and technology is different in hospital and clinics. The context of our model 
is close to Blomqvist and Leger (2005), who considered the question when physicians 
and patients can decide where patients will be treated (i.e., in a hospital or a clinic), when 
information is asymmetric, under different institutional arrangements (i.e., traditional 
insurance or under managed care organization). In addition, the configuration of our 
model is close to Biglaiser and Ma (2007). They considered the situation in which the 
private sector has a better audit technology on service quality than the public sector, 
while our paper assumes that the public hospital has better technology to treat patients 
compared with the private sector. 
 
We emphasize the importance of efficient utilization of hospital resources by providing 
the right type of incentives for doctors and patients to only treat the most serious cases in 
the hospital, and we find that allowing dual practice can help accomplish this in an 
imperfect information setting, as a second best improvement. The configuration of our 
model is different from other papers in several ways. First, we treat physicians as purely 
opportunistic. Morality is not considered as an explanatory variable for physicians’ 
behavior in this paper. Second, patients are heterogeneous in terms of the costs when they 
change providers. Finally, we assume an infinitely elastic supply of physician manpower.  
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The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the environment and model 
specifications. The equilibrium without dual practice, when information is perfect, is 
discussed in Section 3 while Section 4 discusses the case when it is not. Section 5 
analyzes the welfare effect of dual practice when information is imperfect. Section 6 
concludes the paper. 
 
Section 2: Environment: 
There are three kinds of agents in this model: patients, physicians and a local planner. Let 
N  be the number of patients who need treatment in each time period.  For these patients, 
there are two sorts of diseases: serious or mild. The probability to have mild disease is v.  
Patients do not know the severity of illness before they consult a doctor.  Physicians will 
diagnose patients before treatment.   
 
Also, in some of the model versions, patients with serious illness will want to go to 
another doctor for treatment or a second opinion. If they do so, we assume they incur a 
cost. The costs for switching providers consist of two parts. The first part is the costs for 
re-diagnosis. We assume that, for a patient with serious disease, doctors will insist on 
doing their own diagnosis to know more about the patient’s characteristics before treating 
the patient. We believe this is a reasonable assumption for many types of specialized 
medical treatment, such as an operation. The second part of the cost is the (subjective) 
opportunity cost of patients’ time,  effort, and worry  when treatment is delayed as a 
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serious patient changes his service provider2. Patients with different income and 
preferences may have different switching costs. For example, switching costs for patients 
with higher income may be higher since opportunity cost for time spent shopping around 
for providers is higher. An important asymmetry that we impose on the model is that for 
mild cases, going to a second provider will not entail a switching cost. Mild cases need 
only to be diagnosed once. We assume that if the treatment outcome is less than a 
threshold value, physicians who provided diagnosis report will be responsible. Therefore, 
physicians have no incentive to report a serious case as a mild case.   
 
We also assume that in general, patients cannot infer what their illness severity was even 
after they have received treatment. Patients can only observe whether the treatment 
outcome, as measured by a health status variable h, is lower or higher than some 
threshold value h .  
 
Physicians’ utility depends only on their income and time inputs in treating patients. 
Physicians can work in either a hospital or a private clinic. A physician in a private clinic 
is paid by patients on the basis of fee-for-service while a hospital physician works as a 
salaried employee.   
 
                                                            
2 Following the classification of Nilssen (1992), switching costs here can be interpreted as ‘transaction costs’ since they 
are incurred in every switch. 
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Treatment outcome is jointly produced by a non-physician input (i.e., perhaps some kind 
of specialized equipment, or drugs) and the amount of time the physician takes to treat 
the patient. Clinic physicians choose both input levels and total number of patients. Both 
hospital and clinic physicians will be punished if the treatment outcome results in the 
patient attaining a health status h that is less than the minimum acceptable treatment 
outcome  h . The punishment if the actual outcome of a treatment episode is less than the 
minimum acceptable treatment outcome h  is so high that no doctor will find it is optimal 
to under-treat a patient (for example, treating a serious case as a mild case and achieving 
an outcome less than h ). Here, treatment outcome level is translated into two domains: 
better than threshold value h  or not. This simple setting is to identify the benefit of 
physician dual practice, given level of treatment quality. 
 
When dual practice is not allowed, hospital physicians can only work full time in the 
hospital. When dual practice is allowed, hospital physicians can practice part time in 
private clinics. We assume that there is no switching cost if patients (both serious and 
mild cases) are induced by hospital-based physicians in dual practice to go to their private 
clinics, since patients in this case are treated by the same physician who made the 
diagnosis in the first place.  
 
A key assumption that drives the model is that non-physician inputs are more productive 
when used in a hospital.  This assumption may reflect, for example, superior technology 
in the use of some kinds of specialized equipment that is present in the hospital, but 
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which doctors in private clinics cannot afford to acquire. Hence, if a hospital patient is 
diagnosed as a mild case, he will not be treated in the hospital but has to go to a private 
clinic. When dual practice is allowed, a dual practicing physician may offer hospital 
patients to be treated in his own clinic. Patients decide whether to accept this offer. If 
they reject it, they will be treated in the hospital. 
 
The capacity of the hospital (denoted by H) is the number of patients the hospital can 
treat per unit of time. Capacity H is less than the expected number of serious cases in the 
population (i.e., (1-v)N>H). We also assume that decisions for the public hospital are 
made by a local planner (e.g., a local health bureau). The local planner’s objective is to 
maximize social welfare, which we will discuss in detail later. The local planner chooses 
the non-physician input level for hospital patients, the number of physicians to be hired in 
the hospital and the salary for physicians.  The planner also sets the treatment price in the 
hospital.  
 
In the context of healthcare, information is not symmetric between physicians and 
patients, or between the social planner and physicians. In the imperfect-information 
version of the model, we assume that the planner cannot verify physicians’ time inputs in 
the hospital and that patients cannot observe physician time inputs, or the input of non-
physician services, in either the hospital or in private clinics. Therefore, the salary of 
hospital physicians will be paid on the basis of an observable variable such as the number 
of patients being treated. 
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It is important for all providers to choose inputs such that treatment outcome is no less 
than h  in equilibrium. Hence,  to maximize social welfare is equivalent to minimizing 
aggregate social costs, which include switching cost, fees paid to clinic physicians, 
hospital non-physician inputs and total salary paid to hospital physicians. We assume that 
in this model a doctor can always reach the reservation level of utility at equilibrium: if a 
doctor is not hired by local hospital or works in a local private clinic, he can migrate 
somewhere else to get his reservation utility. For the local planner, physicians in the 
hospital or private clinics are considered as outsiders whose utilities do not enter into 
social welfare function. Consequently, the expenditure of hospital physicians’ salary and 
the payments to private clinic physicians are both costs for the local planner. Further, to 
have all the patients treated, local planner needs to make sure that there is no excess 
demand in the hospital. 
 
Section 3: Model specification: the benchmark case with full information 
Patients:   Patients choose providers according to the expected amount of fee including 
treatment costs, diagnosis costs and expected subjective switching costs. Subjective 
switching cost for patients with serious disease is distributed uniformly and 
independently between [0 , ]. Since patients and planner cannot distinguish treatment 
outcome when it is no less than h , patients’ utility can be defined as : 
  , if treatment outcome is less than  h  
W ,   if treatment outcome is no less than  h   where W is disposable income of  
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the patient, which is income less treatment and diagnosis fees, and potential 
subjective switching costs. 
Patients believe that all doctors provide treatment of the same quality, and that, by 
providing proper treatment, the doctor can produce the health outcome he desires, 
without uncertainty. Hence patients make their choice with respect to which doctor to 
visit, on the basis of fees alone. This implies that no doctor can charge a fee above the 
prevailing market rate, so that in effect, we assume that the physician services market is 
perfectly competitive. 
Physicians:  We assume that physicians’ utility function ),( TYu  is in a quasi-linear form 
as follows: 
)(),( TYTYu   
where Y is income for physician, T is the aggregate amount of time spent on treating 
patients and )(T  is the disutility from the number of working hours. )(T  is a strictly 
convex function increasing on T. )(T is non-negative and 0)0(  . Physicians’ 
reservation utility is u . 
 
Physicians use two inputs to produce treatment for a given patient: working hours t  and 
non-physician inputs x  . The following functions g and b are production functions for the 
treatment of mild and serious diseases respectively to produce health outcomes h in the 
different settings:  
),,( cgcg txg  ),,( cbcb txb ),,( hghg txg ),,( hbhb txb   where    >1. 
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Subscripts g and b refer to mild and serious cases respectively. Subscripts h and c denote 
hospital and clinic respectively. Because the coefficient  >1, non-physician inputs are 
utilized more efficiently in the hospital. Because of the assumption that it is never 
optimal for a doctor to treat a patient so that the outcome h is less than the critical value, 
the inputs are effectively constrained by the condition ,),( htxg   and htxb ),( . The 
two inputs satisfy the following condition for a given output subject to the production 
















x .  
Under the case of full information, we assume that optimal choices of inputs are always 
such that it is more costly to treat a serious case than a mild case.  
 
Physicians in either the hospital or clinics spend a fixed amount of time d  to diagnose 
each patient. No non-physician input is required for this purpose. 
Lemma 1: For a given physician reservation utility, it is cost-minimizing for the planner 
to offer full time hospital physicians a contract in which physicians work for the same 
number of working hours as a private physician and have the same income. The number 
of working hours *T  is determined uniquely by )()(')( *** TTTu   . 
Proof:  For a private physician, the optimization problem is to choose a total amount of 
working hours to maximize his utility given market rate of income per unit of time 
)}({max ccT TTwc
   
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where w is income per unit of time. 
First order condition gives )(' cTw  .  
Thus, at equilibrium, a private physician will get the reservation utility: 
)()(' ccc TTTu            (*) 
Since )( cT  is a strictly convex function of cT , we have 0)()('  ccc TTT  . 
Differentiating right-hand-side of (*) with cT , we have 0)('' cc TT  . Differentiating left-
hand-side, we get zero. Left-hand-side is monotonically increasing in cT . Hence, only a 
unique cT  can satisfy (*).   
 
For a hospital physician, the planner is to minimize salary expenditure per unit of time by 
choosing number of working hours subject to constraints on salary. We have following 





h ,              
s .t. uTs h  )(  
First order condition gives uTTT hhh  )()('  . 
It is exactly the same equilibrium condition for a private doctor. Hence, total amount of 
working hours is same for hospital and clinic physicians, and physicians are compensated 
by a rate )(' cTw  per unit of time in both the hospital and clinics. Q.E.D  
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3.1: Market equilibrium without hospital 
First, we consider the case where information is perfect and there is no hospital. In this 
case, we assume that patients can tell not only whether treatment outcomes are less than a 
minimal level h  or not, but that they can also observe non-physician inputs and 
physician’s time inputs in private clinics. However, patients do not know their illness 
severity.  
 
If the physician could mislead the patient, he would have an incentive to tell people with 
a mild form of the disease that they have the serious form. If he did this, he could supply 
the smaller input quantities required for the mild case, but charge the patients as if they 
had received treatment for the serious case.  However, patients can indirectly infer the 
severity of their illness from the observed input level if there is full information. Hence, a 
physician cannot mislead the patient with respect to the seriousness of the patient’s 
illness. This rules out the possibility that a physician can supply a patient with the inputs 
necessary to treat the mild form of illness while claiming that the patient suffers from the 
serious form, and charging the patient the (higher) fee corresponding to treatment of the 
severe illness form.  
 
In this model, there will be three types of market-determined fees: the fee charged for 
diagnosis alone dp , and the fees charged for treating patients with the mild cgp  and 
serious cbp  types of the disease. 
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We assume that a doctor can follow one of several strategies. One is to announce that he 
will diagnose and treat all patients (i.e., patients with both the mild and severe disease). 
Other possible strategies include announcing that the doctor will only treat those with 
either the mild or severe forms of the disease. In addition, a doctor must also announce 
whether he is willing to diagnose a patient, or whether he will only treat patients who 
have been diagnosed by another doctor. 
 
In the full-information version of the model, we can show that there are only three 
strategies that can exist in equilibrium. The first is that a doctor announces that he will 
diagnose and treat both types. The second is that a doctor announces that he will diagnose 
all patients, but only treat those with the severe disease; in an equilibrium when this 
happens, there must also be some doctors who are willing to treat patients with mild cases 
that have been diagnosed by another doctor. 
 
With given market prices, a clinic physician can choose total working hours cT under any 
strategy, by choosing the amount of time he spends treating each patient, and choosing 
the number of patients he will diagnose and treat. Note that physicians choose number of 
patients but not the case mix in his clinic. Consider first a physician who treats and 







   (1.1)  
where ccbcgc Tdtvvtm  ])1([     
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And cm   denotes the number of patients treated and diagnosed. Total number of working 
hours cT  is equal to expected time input for a patient times number of patients cm . cgp  
denotes the fee charged for treating a mild patient. cbp  is the fee charged for treating a 
serious case.  
 
As already discussed, it is assumed that it will be optimal for a clinic to supply enough 
inputs to each case so that the health outcome is at least equal to the specified minimum. 
However, it is obviously also optimal to supply the minimum inputs necessary for this. 
Thus in equilibrium we have 
,),( htxg cgcg   htxb cbcb ),( ;  
   
From (1.1), taking into account above constraints, we can derive the following first order 

















        (1.2)  
These equations can be solved to yield values for both types of inputs as a function of cT , 
for both types of disease. 
 










|  denotes marginal rate of technique substitution when treatment 







|  is the marginal rate of technique 




cT  denotes economic rate of substitution, at which rate non-physician input 
can be substituted by time input while maintaining a constant cost (i.e., )( cT  is 
physician’s income rate per unit of time from Lemma 1). The optimal allocation of 
physicians’ time is achieved when marginal rate of technical substitution between non-
physician and time inputs is equal to economic rate of substitution.  
 
Next consider the first-order condition for cm . It is given by: 
)('])1([)1()1( ccbcgcbcgdcbcg Tdtvvtxvvxppvvp    
Above first order condition implies that expected treatment/diagnosis price is equal to 
expected marginal cost of treatment/diagnosis in a clinic. 
 
Now consider the strategy of only diagnosing and treating serious cases. The first order 
condition for these physicians: 
0)(')(  ccbdcbcb Tdtpxp    
 
The first order condition equations above are generally sufficient to determine all the 
endogenous variables cbcbcgcg txtx ,,,  as functions of the prices cgp , cdp  and dp  for each 
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individual physician, when all physicians follow a strategy of diagnosing and treating 
every patient. Market equilibrium, in addition, requires that prices are high enough so that 
the number of hours worked by all physicians together is enough to provide enough 
treatment for all patients to reach the minimum health status. Since there is only one 
equilibrium condition, it is not enough to determine the individual equilibrium values for 
all three prices separately. However, in Lemma 1, we show that, in order for patients with 
both types of illness to be diagnosed and treated, the net revenue per unit of physician 
time has to be the same for each of these three activities (that is, treating mild or serious 
cases, or diagnosing a patient).  Moreover, this net revenue equals the common marginal 
opportunity cost of physicians’ time. This is to say that, in equilibrium, we must have 
price for each type of diseases equal to marginal cost. 
 
Finally, recall that we assume that there is an infinitely elastic supply of physicians 
willing to practice in the county to which the model applies, as long as they are able to 
achieve at least their reservation utility u . In Lemma 2, we shall show that there is a one-
to-one relationship between the doctor’s return per hour of time supplied and his utility.  
 
Lemma 2: We have following market equilibrium conditions:  
)(' ccgcgcg Ttxp  .         (1.3) 
)(' ccbcbcb Ttxp  .         (1.4) 
)(' cd Tdp  .          (1.5)  
uTTT ccc  )()('  .         (1.6)  
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Proof: See appendix. 
Therefore, in a long-run equilibrium, cT  in (1.6) is equal to *T defined in Lemma1.  The 
number of doctors working in the market will adjust until the total number of hours 
worked is sufficient for both types of patients to obtain both diagnosis and treatment. 
Total number of clinics is ])1[(* dvttvT
N
cgcb  .   
 
Since every patient will be treated at where they are diagnosed, there is no switching cost. 
Total social costs in this case are aggregate fees paid for treatment in the private sector: 
 dcbcg NpNpvpvN  )1(  
From equations (1.3)-(1.6), we can rewrite above expression as  
)]('))(')(1())('([ *** TdTtxvTtxvN cbcbcgcg       (1.7) 
 
3.2: Market equilibrium with hospital 
Now let us consider the case with the public hospital.   
For private clinics, equilibrium conditions (1.2)-(1.6) still hold even when a hospital is 
introduced into the model. When we introduce a hospital which can treat H patients with 
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The local planner’s problem is to minimize social costs, which includes all fees paid to 
private sector plus non-physician resources in public sector and expenditure on 
physician’s salary. The local planner will choose the number of physicians and inputs 
level in the hospital.  
 








hbhb     (1.8) 
where q denotes the number of hospital physicians. No patient needs to pay switching 
costs in this case because the diagnosis report can be verified under full information. 
Each patient only has to be diagnosed once. First item of (1.8) denotes non-physician 
inputs for H hospital patients and the second item denotes the total salary paid to hospital 
physicians. The third and fourth items denote the fee paid to private clinics. The last item 
denotes total resources and fees paid for diagnosis in the private sector. The salary 
constraint for a hospital physician is: 
)( *Tus            (1.9) 
 
Effectively, therefore, the local planner’s principal task is to choose the level of non-
physician input in the hospital, the number of hospital physicians to be hired, and the 
salary they will be offered. In solving this problem, it is first helpful to note that q can be 
written as a function of hbt  and d , the number of physician hours in treatment and 
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diagnosis, and the total number of hours that each physician will work for *T  







Hq hb  .  
Hospital admits and diagnoses
v
H
1  patients in order to find H patients with the serious 
condition. Since the number of working hours is determined from Lemma 1, the number 
of physician q is a function of hbt . Similarly, from Lemma 1, given *T ,  salary s is 
determined from (1.9).   
In this equilibrium, the hospital will treat exactly H patients and no patient with serious 
disease should switch from the hospital to other clinics. Since there is perfect competition 
among providers, the prices for a serious case must be identical for private and public 
providers at equilibrium. Otherwise, there will be too many or too few patients treated in 
the hospital. 
hbp = cbp           (1.10)  
Equilibrium condition for treatment outcomes in the hospital is:  
htxb hbhb ),(           
 
Taking these relationships into account, the problem reduces to finding the optimal level 
of hbx  and  hbt . Differentiating the objective function with respect to hbx , we obtain:   











         (1.11) 
 
Both non-physician input and physician input will be determined by equation (1.11), 
given the equilibrium condition for treatment outcomes. Compared with equation (1.2), 
the right hand side of (1.11) (i.e., economic rate of substitution) is smaller, which means 
that the time input is relatively more expensive in the hospital, which reflects the superior 
technology in the hospital. Hence, for the individual patient with a serious disease, 
physicians’ time input is less in the hospital than in a clinic.  
3.3: Welfare 
By comparing social welfare with and without hospital, incremental social welfare with 
hospital is ]))(('[ * cbhbcbhb xxttTH  .   
 
If there is superior technology to utilize capital input in the hospital, above expression is 
positive and social welfare will increase when there is a hospital.  
 
For the case of full information, the hospital only treats serious cases. The hospital 
receives enough patients so that, given the probabilities, it will only treat H serious cases 
and send all the mild cases to clinics. Doctors in clinics minimize the costs of treating 
serious and mild cases. When there is full information, whether to allow dual practice or 
not can be shown to be not relevant. A physician has no incentive to select a serious case 
to his own clinic since inducing patients will not change the physician’s utility. Every 
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player’s (i.e., physician, planner and patients) action will not change after allowing dual 
practice and case mix in hospital will not change also (i.e., since optimal inputs and 
optimal working hours will remain the same after allowing dual practice from equation 
(1.2)).  
 
3.4: Comparative statics 
See Appendix.  
 
Section 4: Imperfect information without dual practice 
Now, we consider the case where information is imperfect. In this case, we assume that 
the planner can no longer verify the physicians’ time inputs in the hospital. The planner 
as well as patients can only observe whether the treatment outcome in the hospital is 
lower or higher than a minimal value h , but contrary to the previous case, we now 
assume that patients cannot observe what inputs they receive, either of non-physician 
services or of physician services. We make this same assumption for patients treated in 
private clinics or in the hospital.  Thus in this case, it is possible for a physician to 
misrepresent the patient’s medical condition (for example, to claim that a patient with a 
mild form of the illness suffers from a severe form, and charge the patient for treating the 
severe form, even though the input provided in fact were the smaller amounts necessary 
to treat the mild form).  
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We may have a less strict assumption that patients can observe but cannot verify the input 
of providers. The equilibrium conditions we discussed below will not change. To 
simplify the problem here, we just stick to the assumption that patients cannot observe 
providers’ inputs.  
  
Since the hospital planner cannot observe the actual time input of hospital physicians, the 
salary offered by the hospital to physician is assumed to be determined on the basis of the 
number of patients being treated and diagnosed in the hospital by each physician rather 
than on the total amount of time reported by the physician. We begin with the case when 
dual practice is not allowed for hospital physicians. 
 
Since information is asymmetric between patients and physicians, physicians can take 
advantage of their superior information. If physicians misrepresent a mild case as a 
serious case, clinic physicians can charge a higher service fee for such patients while 
hospital physicians can save their time input in treating patients since treating a mild case 
takes less time compared with a serious case. Hence, in both clinics and the hospital, it is 
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4.1: ‘Pure Fraud’ Equilibrium without hospital 
Let us first look at the hypothetical ‘pure fraud’ equilibrium that would apply if there 
were no hospital. Every private clinic physician has the incentive to treat mild cases as 
serious cases. A ‘pure fraud’ equilibrium will emerge, which is referred to an equilibrium 
where every mild case is treated as a serious case.  
 
A clinic physician‘s total number of working hours is icT . Since it is to the physician’s 
advantage to classify every patient as a severe case and charge them the (higher) fee for 








     (1.12) 
where ])1([ dtvvtmT cbcgc
i
c   
subject to ,),( htxg cgcg   htxb cbcb ),(   
Optimal input condition (1.2) still holds in this equilibrium. The price in clinics is: 
)('])1([)1( iccbcgcbcgcb Ttvvtxvvxp           (1.13) 
(1.13) shows that equilibrium price in clinics is equal to expected marginal cost for 
treatment. Physicians will enter the local market as long as they can get the reservation 
utility. Following the same logic as Lemma 1, we know that at the reservation level of 
utility, a private physician will always work for same number of hours *T and the 
equilibrium net revenue per unit of physician time will be the same in every activity.  
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It follows that in this equilibrium, the number of physicians is the same as in the full 
information case since total number of working hours is still Ntvvt cbcg ])1([  . Also, the 
diagnosis cost is the same across all public and private providers. At equilibrium, the 
diagnosis price is )(' *Tdpd  .  
 
Under this equilibrium, no patient will switch to a second physician. This is because 
patients anticipate that every physician is going to misrepresent patients with mild disease. 
The expression for aggregate social costs now changes to the following: 
 dcb NpNp )]('))(')(1())('([ *** TdTtxvTtxvN cbcbcgcg     (1.14) 
It can be shown that these total social costs are the same as in the full-information case. 
There is no loss of efficiency under this ‘pure fraud’ equilibrium. In this case, every 
patient is treated as a serious case but the price for serious illness is lower than the price 
for serious cases under full information and higher than the price for mild cases under full 
information. Mild cases are effectively subsidizing serious cases.   
 
4.2: ‘Pure Fraud’ Equilibrium with hospital 
Now let us consider the model when we introduce a hospital as in the previous section. 
For private sector, the equilibrium condition (i.e., (1.13)) will hold. However, the number 
of physicians is determined by following condition: 







Hospital physicians will classify all patients as severe cases since a hospital physician can 
spend less working time for mild cases by claiming they are serious cases. At the 
equilibrium, the hospital will treat exactly H patients and no patient will switch from 
hospital to other clinics. Since hospital physicians classify all patients as serious, only H 
patients will be admitted, and will be provided with the same level of non-physician 
input hbx , even though some of them are mild cases.  
 
Since the planner cannot observe the physician’s behavior, the planner has to prescribe 
the same amount of hbx  for all cases. However, this amount is chosen knowing that some 
patients will be mild cases. The planner will infer the expected time input for individual 
patients. Consequently, the planner can infer the total number of working hours for a 
hospital physician. From the same line to prove Lemma 1, the number of working hours 
for a hospital physician is the same as that of a clinic physician (i.e., *T ). 
 
The price in the hospital will match the price in the private sector, otherwise there will be 
either no patient coming or there are too many patients to be treated in the hospital.  
Total amount of social costs now are: 
))(( dcbhb ppHNqsHx         (1.15) 
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The first item of the above equation denotes the non-physician inputs in the hospital. The 
second item denotes the salary inputs and the third item denotes the fee paid to private 
clinics (i.e., every patient is treated as a serious case). The last item denotes the resources 
spent for diagnosing patients. 
 
Optimal inputs in the hospital are determined by first order condition (1.15), with respect 















  ,         (1.16) 
Where hgt  is defined as the time input in the hospital to treat a mild case where 













|| ,  equation (1.16) is the same as equation (1.11), 














||  since given capital input in the hospital, for mild cases, marginal 
benefit of time input is less than for serious cases. Hence, compared with (1.11), the 






 |  in (1.16) is larger. There will be less capital input in the 
hospital when information is incomplete. 
 
Intuitively, this is because the planner can infer that there are some mild cases being 
treated in the hospital. Hence, in implementing the input at the level of full information, 
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the marginal benefit of time is larger than marginal cost of time (i.e., physicians can work 
less). Therefore, more physicians’ time input and less non-physician input are 
implemented in the imperfect information case. 
 




Hdtvvtq hbhg          (1.17)  
Planner will pay the salary to a hospital physician on the condition that the number of 
patients treated/diagnosed by this physician: 
q
H , which is determined by *T from (1.17). 
In other words, the planner is effectively minimizing salary expenditure by choosing ihT  
via the number of patients treated by this physician: 
q
H . 
   
4.3: Welfare 
For the ‘pure fraud’ equilibrium, every patient is diagnosed as a serious case. There is 
inefficiency in this equilibrium because some people in the hospital are mild cases. We 
will show this welfare loss formally in next section. However, this ‘pure fraud 
equilibrium’ may be not stable for some parameter values, if physicians have the 
incentive to be specialized as we will discuss in the next section.  
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4.4: ‘Specialization’ Equilibrium 
In the ‘pure fraud’ equilibrium described in the previous section for the case with no 
hospital, there is no inefficiency. However, patients who suffer from the mild version of 
the disease are worse off than they would be in the full information equilibrium, since 
they are paying the higher (common) price for treatment. Thus patients who suffer from 
the mild version of the disease would be better off if they could somehow establish this 
fact, and then obtain (and pay for) the lower-cost treatment necessary for the mild disease. 
As we show in the following sections, it would in fact be possible for them to do so if 
some doctors commit in advance to a strategy of only treating patients with the mild 
version of the disease, while those diagnosed with the severe version would be referred to 
doctors who were willing to treat both versions of the disease (or the severe version only). 
Below we refer to doctors who follow a strategy of only treating patients with the mild 
version of the disease as General Practitioners (GPs). 
 
However, a patient strategy of going to a GP (rather than to a non-specialized clinic) is 
not cost-free. If the patient turns out to have a severe condition, he/she has to consult 
another doctor. He/she will therefore incur the subjective switching cost, and will also 
have to pay for an additional diagnosis (recall our assumption that when a patient with 
the severe form of the illness switches to another provider, he/she has to undergo a 
second diagnosis). 
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As before, under this ‘specialization’ equilibrium, all physicians including GPs and non-
GPs will get their reservation utility at equilibrium.  
 
4.4.1: ‘Specialization’ equilibrium without hospital 
Let us first consider the case without the hospital. The ‘specialization’ equilibrium is 
characterized as follows: 
 
Providers can commit to treating mild diseases only. Patients will choose providers based 
on expected costs for treatment/diagnosis. Recall from the earlier section that when a 
patient with the serious form of the disease switches provider after having been 
diagnosed, he/she incurs a switching cost, consisting of two parts: fees for re-diagnosis, 
and opportunity cost for switching to second provider.  Patients will choose where to be 
diagnosed/treated on the basis of expected costs. For a patient whose switching cost is 
lower than a critical value, he will first visit a GP committed to treating mild cases only. 
If the patient is diagnosed as a serious case, he will switch to another provider (non-GP). 
For a patient whose switching cost is higher than the critical value mentioned above, he 
will visit a non-GP provider. 
 
Some patients may choose to visit a GP in the first place while some patients may prefer 
to visit a non-GP provider. Whether a patient goes to a GP or not depends on the 
expected cost for treatment. Patients with different switching costs may choose different 
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treatment locations. The critical switching cost is ]1,0[m ; a patient with this switching 
cost is indifferent between visiting a GP or a non-specialized doctor. m is defined by  
))(1( dcbcgcb pmpvvpp          (1.18) 
The left-hand-side of above equation is the expected cost for patients who choose to visit 
a non-GP physician and the right-hand-side is the expected cost for patients to have their 
first visit to a GP. The second item on the right-hand-side denotes expected costs when a 
patient has to seek for a second provider after being diagnosed as serious case. 
 
For patients whose switching cost lies between [ m , ], they will go to a non-GP first 
while for those patients whose switching cost lies between [0, m ], they will go to a GP 
first (i.e., patient will follow the strategy described in the previous page). We may 
interpret m as a degree of specialization for health service markets. The higher m is, the 
more people will be diagnosed by a GP physician at the first place. When m=0, no patient 
will visit a GP in the first place. In this case, every patient will be diagnosed as a serious 
case (i.e., ‘pure fraud’ equilibrium). When m=1, at the other extreme, every patient will 
visit a GP for diagnosis.   
 
A ‘pure fraud’ equilibrium cannot hold if physicians who commit to treating mild cases 
only can attain at least the reservation utility. Formally,  
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Proposition 1:  Given cbp  defined by (1.13), cbcg pp  ,  a ‘specialization’ equilibrium 











 udNNvNpNvp cgcgcgcgdcgcgcg mtmmmx   )()(     (**)  











.  Right hand side of this inequality is simply a 
transformation from equation (1.18) to denote the demand for a GP clinic. 
 
cgcg tx ,  are defined by optimal input condition (1.2). For those parameters (i.e.,  , cgx , 
cbx )  satisfying (**), pure fraud equilibrium cannot hold.  
Proof: See Appendix. 
 
After some physicians deviate to be GPs, however, at equilibrium, both GP and non-GP 
physicians will get the reservation utility u . For a GP, treatment price is equal to 
marginal cost as follows: 
)(' cgcgcgcg Ttxp           (1.19) 
where cgT  is total number of working hours for a GP.  cgn  is the number of GPs, which is 
determined by following equilibrium conditions: 
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 )()(' cgcgcg TTTu       (1.20) 
 
From Lemma 1, the number of working hours is the same as other equilibria (i.e., *T ). 
We can also determine the number of GP clinics cgn  by 
mNdmvNtTn cgcg *      
The left-hand-side of above equation is the total amount of time spent for all GP 
physicians while the right-hand-side represents the total amount of diagnosing/treatment 
time. 
 










)1(        (1.21) 
The numerator on the right-hand-side of (1.21) denotes the total number of mild cases.  
The denominator denotes the total number of patients since mv patients will go to a GP 








vs ,  it implies that vv s  . There is a lower proportion of mild cases 
being treated in the clinics compared with the case of ‘pure fraud’ equilibrium.  
 
Treatment price for a serious case is the only relevant price for a non-GP clinic, which is 









cb Ttvtvxvxvp       (1.22) 





s xvxv )1(   denotes expected non-physician input and cbscgs tvtv )1(   is the 
expected physician time input, given that sv  denotes case mix in a non-GP clinic. icT  
denotes the number of non-GP physician’ total working time.  
 
The number of clinics cn  can be written as a function of a non-GP physician’ total 











c        (1.23) 
The time input for a patient in a non-GP clinic is dtvtv cb
s
cg
s  )1( . 
Following the same logic as Lemma 1, the number of working hours for a non-GP clinic 
i
cT  is the same as that for a GP (i.e., *T ).  Hence, the diagnosis cost is the same across all 
public and private providers. At equilibrium, the diagnosis price is equal to marginal cost. 
 )(' *Tdpd  .          (1.24) 
 
It is straightforward to see that the optimal input condition in a clinic is the same as full 
information case (i.e., equation (1.2)). As we have discussed before, the number of clinic 
physicians is larger than the full information case and ‘pure fraud’ equilibrium case. This 
is because some patients will be diagnosed twice. The aggregate number of working 
hours for all physicians increases. Since every physician has same amount of working 
hours, the total number of physicians will increase.  
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Under   ‘specialization’ equilibrium, the following inequalities must be fulfilled to have 
)1,0(m   
dcgcb ppp v
v 1    iff m0      (1.25) 
)(1 dcgcb ppp v
v    iff m1      (1.26) 





tx cgcgcbcbcgcg x     
To get an interesting equilibria, the first inequality of above expression makes sure there 
are always some patients who see non-GP in the first place.  We may interpret the second 
inequality as that, to give incentive to a physician to be a GP, cost difference between 
treating a patient in serious condition and treating a patient in mild condition have to be 
high enough. At the same time, switching costs (i.e.,  ) have to be high enough to attract 
some (mild) patients to be diagnosed and treated in a non-GP clinic. 
 
Corollary 1: With some parameter values, either ‘specialization’ equilibrium or ‘pure 
fraud’ equilibrium may emerge. 
Proof: See Appendix. 
 
                                                                                              47 
 
In other words, there may be more than one equilibrium even with the same set of 
parameter values. Intuitively, the corollary implies that which equilibrium will emerge 
may depend on history or how the equilibrium was initially established for local health 
service markets (i.e., path dependence on the status quo). For some parameter values, if 
status quo is ‘specialization’ equilibrium, ‘specialization’ equilibrium is stable; if status 
quo is ‘pure fraud’ equilibrium, ‘pure fraud’ equilibrium is stable as well. In this case, 
history matters. 
 
Under specialization equilibrium, Nvm )1(   patients will switch to a second provider. 
Total social costs are  




)1( 2    
The first item of (1.27),  , indicates aggregate switching costs. 
2
)1( mv  is the average 
switching cost for a patient who visits a GP first and dNpvm )1(    indicates the amount 
of diagnosed costs. The last item in (1.27) denotes first-time diagnosed cost for all 
patients.  
 
Substituting cbcg pp , and dp  from (1.19), (1.22) and (1.24), social costs increases by   
compared with the social costs under ‘pure fraud’ equilibrium.  This implies that the 
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specialization equilibrium actually will increase the social costs since more people have 
to switch to a second provider. It is similar to adverse selection in health insurance in 
which patients with low risk prefer to get less insurance coverage by paying a low 
premium. Total welfare will be less compared to the case where every patient is forced to 
join a common insurance pool. Similarly, under a ‘specialization’ equilibrium in this 
paper, patients with low switching costs are willing to search for a second provider. Such 
a ‘specialization’ equilibrium is profitable privately but it is inefficient socially.  
 
4.4.2: ‘Specialization’ equilibrium with hospital 
Now, let us introduce the hospital into this setting. All equilibrium condition in private 









The hospital will set the price exactly equal to the price in a non-GP clinic. Otherwise, 
there will be too many or too few patients treated in the hospital. In this case, the case 
mix in hospital and a non-GP clinic is the same (i.e., sv ). 
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The last item within the brackets in (1.28) denotes the fee paid from patients diagnosed 
with serious diseases. Nm)1(   is the number of patients who seeking for non GP in the 
first place. Nmv  )1(  is the number of patients who switch providers. Since hospital 
physicians always misrepresent mild cases under ‘specialization equilibrium’, the 
equilibrium condition for treatment outcome is the same as ‘pure fraud equilibrium’. 







h ])1([         (1.29) 
Time input for a patient in the hospital is dtvtv hb
s
hg
s  )1(  since every patient 
diagnosed in the hospital will not switch to a second provider. Following the same 
argument as in the proof of Lemma 1, ihT  is a constant and equal to clinic physicians’ 





s  , where hbhg tt , are defined by (1.30) below. 
 














        (1.30) 
The amount of capital input in hospital is smaller compared with full information case 
(1.11). There are fewer non-physician inputs and more physician inputs, compared with 
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full information case. However, the amount of capital inputs in hospital is larger than in 




For the ‘specialization’ equilibrium with hospital, there is still inefficiency since there are 
mild cases in the hospital but there is less inefficiency in this case.  The reason is that 
case mix changes when physicians are specialized. A higher proportion of serious case 
will go to the hospital for diagnosis in the first place.  
 
Proposition 2: There is welfare loss under ‘specialization’ equilibrium compared with 
welfare under full information case.  
Proof:  see Appendix. 
 
We will now summarize our conclusions regarding the efficiency losses that exist in 
equilibria under imperfect information and in the presence of a hospital. Under ‘pure 
fraud’ equilibrium, there is no inefficiency in the form of switching costs, but there is 
inefficiency in the sense that some mild cases will be treated in hospital, and the use of 
non-physician input in the hospital will not be set at its optimal level. Under the 
‘specialization’ equilibrium, there will be inefficiency in the form of switching costs, but 
because many mild cases will be treated by GPs, there will be a smaller proportion of 
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mild cases seeking treatment in the hospital. The latter effect will indirectly contribute to 
more efficient utilization of the hospital’s capacity (since a smaller proportion of hospital 
patients will be mild cases). Thus under ‘specialization’ equilibrium, the hospital can take 
better advantage of superior technology.  
 
4.4.4: Comparative statics 
See Appendix. 
Section 5: Imperfect information with dual practice 
Suppose now dual practice is allowed. All the other settings are the same as Section 4. 
Patients who are treated in dual practice clinics do not need to pay a switching cost since 
they are referred to the dual practice clinics by the same hospital physician. Every 
hospital physician will have incentives to induce mild patients to his own private clinic. 
Patients cannot observe inputs from a dual practicing physician. Patients are indifferent to 
being treated in the hospital or in a dual practicing clinic as long as there are no price 
differences. After allowing physician dual practice, some hospital patients will be offered 
to be treated in a dual practice clinic as serious cases (Note that even though dual-practice 
hospital based physicians will classify and charge all patients as serious cases, it will be 
to their advantage to treat as many mild cases as possible in their private clinics.)  
 
As we will show later, there will eventually be less mild cases treated in the hospital 
compared with the regime disallowing dual practice. This gives us a central result of this 
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paper: A planner can achieve second best welfare improvement by allowing dual practice. 
This is true whether the equilibrium without dual practice would be a ‘pure fraud’ 
equilibrium or a (mixed or pure) ‘specialization’ equilibrium. 
 
5.1: ‘Pure Specialization’ equilibrium with dual practice  
Consider first the case where, without dual practice, we would have a ‘pure 
specialization’ equilibrium. In this case, inequality (1.26) in the previous section is not 
satisfied. Everybody will visit a GP first (i.e., m1). Allowing physician dual practice 
will not change the case mix in the hospital since there are only serious cases within the 
hospital. In this case, the optimal input condition in a hospital is the same as first best. 
For the county as a whole, the welfare will be strictly less than first best for this case 
since every patient with the serious disease has to switch providers (whether they go to a 
non-specialized clinic or a hospital). In comparison with full information case, the 
welfare loss comes from additional switching cost: Npv d )2
)(1(   .  
 
The preceding discussion referred to the case where m=1. In the following discussion, we 
will focus on the case where m is located between [0,1), which implies there are some 
patients who visit non-GP physicians in the first place.  
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5.2: ‘Pure fraud’ equilibrium and ‘Specialization’ equilibrium with dual practice 
For ‘Pure fraud’ equilibrium and ‘Specialization’ equilibrium, m[0,1). The planner will 
still set the price in the hospital at the same level as a non-GP clinic to eliminate excess 
demand. The equilibrium condition for clinic physicians including both GP and non-GP 
is the same as for the case with no dual practice (i.e., (1.19) and (1.22)). The total number 
of non-GP physician’s working time and a GP’ s total working time are also the same as 
the regime without dual practice (i.e., *T ). Optimal inputs condition remains the same as 
(1.2). 
 
Therefore, the critical value of m remains the same. The number of GPs is the same as 
before. However, as we will show below, at equilibrium, after allowing dual practice, 
more patients are diagnosed in hospital since some of them will be induced to dual 
practicing clinics. Consequently, fewer patients consult physicians in private sector. The 






dc       (1.31) 
where dm  is the number of patients being induced from the hospital to his private clinic 
by individual hospital-based physicians with dual practice. Comparing the above 
equation (1.31) with equation (1.23), we observe that a positive dm will lead to a smaller 
cn  given 
*T . Therefore, the number of non-GP physicians cn is less than in the regime 
disallowing dual practice.Market prices for non-GP private clinics are the same as (1.22). 
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 After allowing dual practice, there are two possible equilibria: depending on whether 
there is a corner or an interior solution of inducement behavior for dual practice 
physicians. 
 
5.3: First equilibrium: the corner solution  
If the rent for misrepresenting a mild patient in the hospital is high enough, the dual 
practicing physician will induce all the mild patients to their own clinics (i.e., the corner 
solution).  
 














  is the amount of time spent in the dual practicing physicians’ private 
clinic. 
 
When dual practice is allowed, a physician’s working hours in the hospital is no longer 
equal to the private physician’s working hours as in Lemma 1. Also, the dual practicing 
physicians’ budget constraint is different from full time hospital physicians due to 
additional income from private practice. In this case, apart from choosing optimal inputs, 
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the planner chooses the number of physicians to minimize total salary expenditure. The 








hb   
The last item denotes total diagnosis cost in the private sector since there are ds pv
H
1  
number of patients who are diagnosed in the hospital.  
 
The first order condition with respect to q is: 
))((')())(( qTqTqTu ddd          (1.33) 
Compared with (1.6), the total number of working hours for a physician is the same as 
full information case. Therefore, the number of working hours in the hospital for a dual 
practicing physician is less than in the regime without dual practice. In this situation, 
there is no mild case being treated in the hospital. Therefore, planner’s optimal input 
condition is defined by (1.11) (i.e., the same as full information case). 
 
Proposition 3: For the corner solution equilibrium, in general, dual practice is a second 
best welfare improvement when information is imperfect. Welfare achieves the first best 
level when m=0. 
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Proof: When the planner implements the same optimal inputs hbx , hbt  at full information 
case as in this case, we can show that additional social costs, compared with (1.8) under 
full information, are: .0)1(
2
)1( 2  dNpvmNmv   
 
From proof of Proposition 2 (see appendix), welfare loss when dual practice is disallowed, 
compared to full information case, is strictly greater than dNpvmNmv )1()1(2
1 2   , 
which is the welfare loss when dual practice is allowed. Therefore, allowing dual practice 
is a second best welfare improvement. If m=0, it is a pure fraud equilibrium at the private 
sector. We have already shown previously that the private sector is efficient under pure 
fraud equilibrium. Since all patients in hospital are serious cases, resource allocation in 
the hospital is also efficient. Hence, dual practice can improve welfare at the first best. 
Q.E.D. 
 
There are two reasons for welfare improvement. First, the welfare improvement is due to 
the saving of salary. The intuition here is that after allowing dual practice, physicians will 
select mild cases to their own clinics. Hence, these physicians will accept a lower salary 
from the hospital. Consequently, the planner anticipates this and pays a smaller amount 
of salary to hospital physicians. Second, since more serious cases are treated in the 
hospital, non-physician inputs for serious cases in the hospital are more efficiently 
utilized in general.  
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In this case, if the switching cost is very high, m is close to 0. In contrast to our intuition, 
a higher switching cost will increase social welfare. This is because fewer people are 
willing to switch to second providers if the cost to do so is higher. 
 
5.4: Second equilibrium: the interior solution 
If the rent for misrepresenting a mild patient in the hospital is not high enough, the dual 
practicing physician will not induce all the mild patients to their own clinics (i.e., the 
interior solution).  
 






max  )()( dd
d













sd )1(  ,  
The proportion of mild case in hospital is dv . dv  is derived from the equation 
))(1()1( qmHvHv d
sd  . After patients are induced to dual practicing private 
clinics, the non-physician input is set at the optimal level for mild cases since patients 
cannot observe inputs in a private clinic. d
cg
t  and d
cg
x  are the inputs for a dual practice 
physician. 
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The first order condition on (1.34) with respect to d
cg













The above equation is identical to equation (1.2) when *TTd  (we will show this below), 
which implies that the optimal time inputs and non-physician inputs are the same as the 
case under full information 
 
If the inducement behavior for a dual practicing physician has an interior solution, the 





hb Tdtttvxp cgcg        (1.36) 
Substituting (1.22) into (1.36), we have a condition for an interior solution: 
0)(']
1




We may interpret above equation that a physician will stop inducing patients to his 
private clinic at some point when disutility of working is equal to monetary benefit for 
the patient at the margin. 
 
At equilibrium, a dual practice physician’s utility is the reservation utility    
)()( dd
d
hb Tsmxpu cg          (1.37) 
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  (1.38) 
There are qmH d  patients being diagnosed by the hospital. Given constraint (1.37) and 
physician’s optimal condition (1.36), we can characterize the optimal number of hospital 










        
Rearrange it and from (1.36), we have 
)(')()( ddd TTTu    
From above equation, the physicians’ total number of working hours is still the same as 
previous equilibria (i.e., *T ). The diagnosis cost is the same in both hospital and clinics. 
It immediately follows that more hospital physicians will be hired when dual practice is 
allowed (i.e., the number of total working hours is same for every physician but in this 
case, physicians only work part time in the hospital). 
 

















        (1.39)  
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Non-physician inputs in hospital are smaller compared with full information case (1.11). 




sd  )1(  is 
less than the regime disallowing dual practice. Compared with (1.30), a lower proportion 
of mild cases are treated in the hospital after allowing dual practice. Now, we have the 
following Proposition 4 to show that allowing dual practice is a second best welfare 
improvement. 
 
Proposition 4: For the interior solution equilibrium, the social welfare is higher when 
dual practice is allowed, compared with the regime disallowing dual practice with 
imperfect information.   
Proof:  To prove this proposition, we can compare the social welfare function with dual 
practice and without dual practice. We can do this by comparing equation (1.28) with 
(1.38). Let { ***** ,,,, qstxp hbhbhb } be the vector minimizing (1.28) when dual practice is 
disallowed.  If the planner implements **** ,,, qtxp hbhbhb  but chooses a 
~
s  different from *s  
when dual practice is allowed. Let '
d
T  denote the number of physicians’ working hours 

























    (1.40) 
The last equality holds from first order condition (1.36) on dm . When 0dm , last 
expression in  (1.40) is equal to zero. 
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Since  (.) is a strictly convex function after substituting '
d
T  from (1.35), we have the 









h     (1.41) 
 







h                (1.42) 
Therefore, from (1.42), total amount of salary is strictly less after allowing dual practice 
when 0dm . Consequently, total social costs are less after allowing dual practice. Q.E.D. 
 
Again, the improvement of welfare after allowing dual practice is due to the saving of 
salary expenditure and more efficiently usage of non-physician inputs in the hospital.  For 
both of the corner and interior equilibria, it is interesting that the welfare improvement is 
not due to reduction of switching costs. The number of patients who choose to go to a GP 
clinic in the first place is the same as the regime without dual practice, since the value of 
switching cost remains the same.  
 
Section 6: Conclusion and discussion 
In the literature, models have been constructed in which physician dual practice improves 
welfare under the assumption that physicians are heterogeneous in morality or quality. 
We highlight in this paper that allowing dual practice can improve welfare even when 
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physicians have homogeneous quality/morality. When information is asymmetric among 
physicians, patients and the planner, dual practice can be conceived as a tool to improve 
welfare in two ways: first, resource allocation within the hospital is more efficient; 
second, allowing dual practice can save salary expenditure for the public hospital. 
 
Several potential equilibriums may emerge given heterogeneous switching costs among 
patients. The ‘specialization’ equilibrium can give us some further insights. As long as 
health service market is not fully specialized (i.e., the hospital still treats some patients 
with mild diseases), dual practice can be interpreted as a complementary instrument to 
achieve specialization. Further, in our model, people with high opportunity cost (high 
income) in switching providers will be more likely to go to the hospital while people with 
low opportunity cost in switching providers (low income) will visit the GP first. Hence, 
after allowing dual practice, rich patients with mild cases are more likely to be induced to 
private clinics from the hospital. Low income patients, or patients with serious conditions, 
are more likely to be treated in the hospital. Therefore, in our model, physician dual 
practice can also be interpreted as an alternative instrument for sorting in terms of both 
illness severity and switching costs.  
 
This paper is built upon the assumption that the health service market is perfectly 
competitive with respect to physician fees. Perhaps this assumption is closer to the reality 
in some localities such as cities/counties in urban China where the number of jobs in 
public hospitals is limited and the number of graduates from medical school is much 
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larger. Even though public hospitals have a certain degree of market power in China at 
this moment, dual practice can be still useful in Chinese context after the time when, as 
expected, deregulation of the health service market has taken place through the current 
round of hospital reform (Qian 2009)3. A possible extension for this paper may be to treat 
the health service market as monopolistic competitive, which can be applied to a wider 
context. 
 
In this paper, we have a simple assumption that the level of quality can only take two 
values (i.e., smaller or not smaller than the threshold value). In the real world, health 
service providers may compete in continuous quality, which may not be observable for 
the planner.  Consequently, a dual practice physician’s behavior may change. For 
example, in India, dual practice physicians provide services with relatively low quality in 
public hospitals so that high income patients are willing to pay more to be treated at 
physicians’ private clinics (Yip and Mahal 2008).  
 
Physicians’ behavior and the welfare implications of dual practice may also change when 
patients have different insurance status. For example, when patients have supplementary 
private insurance such as the case in Australia, patients are willing to be treated in 
                                                            
3 Whether to allow dual practice is a very important issue in the current health reform in China. Previously, dual 
practice is completely banned in China (García-Prado and González 2007).  Allowing dual practice is part of the health 
reform proposal released in April 2009 since it is believed to be a way to improve physician's income and promote 
competition between public hospitals (http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/2009-04/07/content_1279256.htm). Ministry of health 
also released a document in September 2009 to have pilot project for dual practices gradually in public hospitals (See 
recent document from health ministry, downloadable from http://www1.www.gov.cn/zwgk/2009-
09/16/content_1418981.htm). 
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privately owned clinics as is the case in this paper. This may make dual practice more 
attractive for doctors. On the other hand, in systems where doctors’ incentives are 
influenced by contracts that they have with insurers (as under managed-care insurance), 
their tendency to take advantage of their information advantage  may be less. However, in 
a country where private practices are not covered by national health/insurance system 
such as UK, patients may be less likely to accept an inducement from a public hospital to 
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Chapter 2:  Health Financing Reform and Fiscal Decentralization 
In China 
 
Section 1: Introduction    
After the collapse of the central planning system in China in the 1980s, health 
expenditure has been increasing rapidly, with the largest share of the cost being borne by 
patients as out-of-pocket payments (National Survey on Health Service in 2003, Ministry 
of Health 2004A). To address this problem, the Chinese government is planning to 
reform the health system within the next decade. According to current plans, the new 
system will be built upon two pillars: wide insurance coverage and a network of publicly 
owned township and urban community clinics. Local government (i.e., city/county 
government), rather than central government, will be responsible for both pillars: local 
government will both manage, and be financially responsible for, the social insurance 
plans and township/urban community clinics, subject only to broad state guidelines and 
with some degree of subsidy from the state.  
 
A high degree of decentralization of management of health insurance and health services 
provision is likely to be useful or even necessary in China, as efficient management has 
to take account of local conditions. However, decentralization can also cause problems if 
the incentives of local government decision-makers differ from those of the central 
authorities. As many have noted, this is likely to be a significant problem under current 
conditions in China. In particular, decision-makers at the local level face strong fiscal 
pressures since the revenue they are able to raise from the taxes they can raise from their 
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own sources, and the transfers they receive from higher levels of government, are not 
sufficient to pay for the public sector expenditure programs for which they are 
responsible. Moreover, as part of the strategy of  ‘market-preserving federalism’ 
(Bardhan 2002, Qian and Weingast 1997), local government decision-makers have been 
strongly encouraged to raise as much revenue as possible for investment in locally-owned 
enterprises, and cadres’ promotion prospects have to a large extent depended on their 
success in doing so and raising the growth rate of local GDP (Whiting 2004). 
  
An important question for future Chinese health policy is the role to be played by private 
insurance. In this paper, we argue that the answer to this question will indirectly be 
influenced by the fiscal pressures faced by local government. In principle, private 
insurance can play a useful role in China’s future health financing system. By 
strengthening the degree of risk pooling, private insurance can serve as a useful 
supplement to social health insurance in developing countries (Bhattacharjya and Sapra 
2008). At the same time, as the U.S. experience shows, a major role for private health 
insurance in a country’s health care system may also contribute to high health care costs 
through the moral hazard effect. However, this tendency is mostly relevant for 
conventional forms of health insurance. Insurance through different forms of managed 
care plans can potentially help keep costs down. Thus, depending on what form it takes, 
the development of private insurance may be a potential solution for containing rapidly 
increasing health expenditure in the Chinese context. There are two ways through which 
an increased role for private insurers could help to reduce healthcare cost. First, 
competition between public and private health insurance plans could reduce health 
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service expenditure by lowering the health services prices through negotiation between 
insurers and providers (Blomqvist and Qian 2008a). Second, private insurance plans with 
considerable bargaining power may discipline health service providers to reduce 
physician-induced demand through contractual arrangements regarding treatment 
procedures and prices. Therefore, competition between public and private insurers is of 
interest to the central government in the context of current health reform.  
 
Private insurance in China has grown quickly recently4. However, it is hard for private 
insurers to offer profitable conventional policies because of the uncertainty caused by 
rapidly growing health expenditure5. Anticipating this problem, a recent regulation 
(China Insurance Regulatory Commission 2006) encourages private insurers to function 
as managed care type insurers, who monitor and control health service costs by 
contractual relationships with a health service provider network. From the year 2005, 
some managed care type insurer-provider networks are piloted in several cities and 
provinces6. To control providers’ opportunistic behavior such as supplier induced 
demand, provider-insurer contracts in some cities are set as renewable annually, with 
renewal being contingent on providers’ cost controlling performance.  
 
Competition between private and social insurance may have a significant influence on the 
policies of local governments in the health care sector, since it can influence the cost of 
                                                            
4 There are 250 million enrollees under various commercial insurance plans in China in year 2005. See 
http://www.china.com.cn/news/txt/2007-06/01/content_8329172_2.htm.  
5 It is reported that loss ratio (i.e., the ratio of the annual claims paid by an insurance company to the premiums 
received) for the majority of private insurers is over 80%, with the loss ratios for some companies were over 200% in 
year 2005. See http://www.ikang.com/news/article.php?id=504&types=. 
6 For example, in Shengyang City (http://www.nen.com.cn/78026842665123840/20060831/2000119.shtml) and in 
Jiangsu province http://news.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2005-01/02/content_2408441.htm. 
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social health insurance as well as the cost of health services (Blomqvist 2009). But the 
local government is also likely to have considerable regulatory influence over the 
conditions under which private insurance can compete with social insurance. Analyzing 
how local governments will use this regulatory influence is one important objective of 
this paper. Specifically, we investigate the conditions under which local governments 
have incentives to discourage private insurers from entering local health insurance 
markets through political instruments such as local policy/regulation. Secondly, we 
analyze the conditions under which competition from private insurance plans will cause 
local governments to try to improve the quality of coverage in the social insurance plans 
that they manage (for example, by introducing more generous reimbursement policies) so 
as to attract more enrollees to join the social health insurance plans7.  
 
1.1: The link between the health system and the inter-government fiscal system 
Building a new health system in China is an attempt to deal with the problems of 
increasing health expenditure and a high ratio of out-of-pocket payment ( ‘user fees’). On 
the one hand, in both urban and rural areas, a number of social health insurance plans 
have been initiated by different levels of government in order to reduce the share of user 
fees in financing the health care system, especially for inpatient care in county and city 
hospitals.8 On the other hand, it is planned that a large number of publicly owned and 
subsidized local health service facilities will be established in order to supply primary 
                                                            
7 In the model, we consider the situation where private health insurance competes with social insurance. We do not 
consider cases where private insurance supplements social insurances. 
8 Currently, there are three sets of social health insurance plans in China:  Basic Health Insurance System for Urban 
Staff and Workers (BHIS), the New rural Co-operative Medical Scheme (NCMS) and Urban resident health insurance 
plan. NCMS and resident plans are voluntary (Blomqvist and Qian 2008a). 
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(outpatient) care. For each township, there would be at least one publicly funded health 
center and for urban areas, networks of clinics in each community are being built, most of 
which are publicly funded (e.g., see Ma, et al. 2007)9. The tasks to fund these health 
insurance plans and provider clinics are largely falling upon governments at the 
city/county level10. (In this paper, we use the term “local government” to refer to these 
levels of government in China.)  
 
A health care system in which local government simultaneously functions as insurer and 
provider at the county/city level is similar in some ways to the publicly owned and 
managed regional monopoly National Health Services (NHS) system in the UK or the 
Veterans Health Administration (VHA) system in the U.S. (for NHS, see Blomqvist 2002: 
for VHA, see Oliver 2007). However, there are several institutional features that are 
unique to China. Under the UK NHS and the American VHA, the budgets for the local 
health authorities or branches are provided through allocations from the central (federal) 
government. In other countries (such as Canada, and in the U.S. for the state Medicaid 
plans that cover those with low income), responsibility for funding is more decentralized, 
but only to the second level of government (Canadian provinces or American states). In 
China, in contrast, local governments at the third or fourth level from the top, are 
responsible not only for managing the health services system, but also for raising a large 
part of the funds that the local health agencies need. Therefore, the prospects for health 
                                                            
9 Blomqvist and Qian (2008a) discusses recent policies and future trends in Chinese health reform and analyzed the 
potential for a private and public mix in the health provision and insurance sectors.  Yip and Hsiao (2008) considered 
alternative payment systems for providers as part of the ongoing reform in China.  
10 Gu, et al. (2006) provides recent case studies on how social health insurance plans work in both urban and rural areas. 
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reform depend to a large extent on the fiscal capability of local government under the 
arrangements dividing taxation authority between different administrative levels. 
However, it is widely realized that the current inter-government fiscal relationships in 
China, as a legacy of the central planning system and the piecemeal reforms that have 
taken place since the 1980’s, have not given very strong revenue-raising capability to the 
county/city levels of government (World Bank 2002, Wong and Bird 2008, Zhou 2004, 
Lou and Wang 2008).  
 
Under the current inter-government fiscal system, local and central governments are 
sharing tax revenue on terms that are not very favourable to the former. For example, the 
central government receives 75% of value added tax revenue, which accounts for half of 
aggregate tax revenue. Looking at the total revenue, the central government accounted for 
more than 52% in 2005; for comparison, revenue of local governments in 2003 accounted 
for only 34% of the total (excluding transfers from central government, see Whiting 
2007)11.  
 
The fiscal pressure on local government decision-makers is also strong because they have 
been allocated heavy expenditure responsibilities, not only in the area of health but in 
other areas as well. Recently, an arrangement referred to as the “target responsibility 
system” has been introduced (In Chinese “目标责任制” ”Mubiao Zerengzhi”, see Tsui 
                                                            
11 Revenue of county and township level government accounts for around 20% of  total government revenue in 2000 
(Pei 2006:178, Wei 2004).  
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and Wang 2008, Zhou 2004). Under the target responsibility system, the performance of 
local cadres is evaluated to a large extent on the basis of their ability to raise enough 
funds to deliver a defined range of social welfare and other public services12. Another 
factor that plays a large role in the evaluation of cadres, and therefore their chances for 
promotion, is the local GDP growth rate (Li and Zhou 2005, Whiting 2004). Therefore, 
local government decision-makers have a strong incentive to maximize revenue to invest 
on infrastructure and public projects to increase local GDP13.  
 
For all these reasons, it is not surprising that expenditure of local governments in total 
accounted for 51% of total government expenditure (as opposed to only 34% of total 
government own-revenue) in 2003 (Whiting 2007)14. Nor is it a surprise to see that 791 
out of 1635 rural based county governments did not have enough revenue to cover their 
expenditure in 2004 (China Reform 2007)15. Consequently, many local governments 
must rely significantly on revenue outside of the normal budget system16, as well as on ad 
                                                            
12 Wong and Bird (2008) and World Bank (2002) discuss the current Chinese inter-government fiscal system and its 
effects on implementing the assigned responsibilities (e.g., education, health and pensions). 
13Huang (1996) also argues that the cadre management system is a causal factor with respect to local government’s 
investment behavior.  However, Tao and Yang (2008) argued that this kind of cadre evaluation system is endogenously 
determined by local fiscal conditions. County level government, whose fiscal condition is tighter compared to upper 
level governments, adopts this evaluation system in the first place. Later on, upper level governments also adopt this 
evaluation system. Hence, the evaluation system can be interpreted as a response to tight fiscal conditions.  Regardless 
of which of these analyses is correct, local government behavior is strongly influenced by fiscal incentives. 
14Expenditure of local government together with provincial level government accounted for more than 74% of total 
government expenditure in 2005. 
15 It is widely reported that local government’s debt is extremely high, much of which has been incurred in order to 
finance public projects. It is estimated by the People’s Bank of China that the amount of local government’s debts was 
over 5 trillion in 2009, which is 164% of local government revenue (see 
http://stock.sohu.com/20100302/n270518211.shtml).  Local governments’ debt is estimated to be at least 16% of 
national GDP. A recent survey on local government debt can be found in Oi and Zhao (2007). 
16 Off budget revenue includes extra-budgetary funds and off budget funds. Extra-budgetary funds are defined as   
“levies and user charges collected and spent by government agencies in performing duties delegated to them by higher 
levels.” And “All resources managed directly or indirectly by administrative branches of the government outside the 
normal budgetary process”, which are overseen by Ministry of Finance (Whiting 2007). Off budget funds refer to the 
funds/revenues which are not subject to Ministry of Finance’s supervision (Whiting 2007). 
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hoc transfers17 and matching grants from upper level governments, to maintain day-to-
day operation18.   
 
The high degree of fiscal pressure on local governments affects the health sector in 
several ways.  
 
First, it is likely to have a major influence on the way hospitals operate. Although there 
were large scale hospital reforms in the 2000’s, the majority of hospitals in China are 
publicly owned (see Gu, et al. 2006:94). Thus the operating costs of most hospitals, 
including basic salaries of the hospitals’ staff, are effectively paid from local 
government’s budget19. Hospital salary budgets are large in relation to total expenditure 
of local government, and may be inflated when governments require them to hire 
redundant civil servants who otherwise would be unemployed (Liu, et al. 2009, World 
Bank 2002)20. The pressure from these expenditure requirements makes it very attractive 
for local government to induce hospitals to raise as much revenue as possible from the 
patients that they treat, and the data show that revenue from public service units such as 
hospitals is one of the important sources of off budget revenue21.  
                                                            
17 Central government’s transfers accounted for 69% of the total revenue of local government in the year 2003. Many 
of these transfers are allocated without well-defined rules. Similar institutional arrangements are applied to transfers 
between lower level governments (see Lin 2007 and Wong and Bird 2008 for detailed discussions). 
18 A recent report Whiting (2007) contains a detailed discussion of the latest issues concerning the central/local fiscal 
relationships in China. Zhou (2004) is a detailed field study on the organization and day-to-day operations of a county 
government in northern China. 
19 Around 9-12 percent of hospital expenditure including basic salary of physicians was financed from government 
budget in early 2000s (Wang 2009).  In year 2008, the number is about 8.3%(China Health Statistics Yearbook 2009). 
20 In a recent interview, a hospital manager stated that only around 300 out of 2,000 employees in a city hospital had 
been recruited publicly (Southern Weekend, Nov 22, 2007). 
21 Wong and Bird (2008) mention briefly the importance of hospital revenue as a source to cover local government’s 
expenditure. A document from the Ministry of Finance also mention revenue from a range of health services as part of 
extra budget funding of local government (Ministry of Finance 1999). A recent interview with an official source (the 
vice president of the health bureau of Guangdong province) also reveals that some local governments could pay for 
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The planned reforms outlined in the recently published guideline for health system 
reform will modify the ability of hospitals to raise revenue, as they will place constraints 
on the amount of revenue they can raise through markups on the pharmaceuticals they 
provide to patients, and on the fees they can charge for various procedures (Xinhua News 
Agency 2009). To compensate for the projected decrease in the amount of revenue that 
patients will be able to raise through patient charges, hospitals will be partially 
compensated via increased subsidies from the central and provincial governments. 
However, while the reforms will place certain constraints on the strategies that hospitals 
can follow in order to raise revenue from patients, they will not affect local governments’ 
interest in hospitals’ operating results to the extent that local governments retain effective 
residual responsibility for covering the hospitals’ net operating deficits. 
 
Also, in the same guideline for current round of health reform, more autonomy is going 
to be granted to public hospitals. In this case, many public hospitals are going to behave 
as an independent “legal person” and be corporatized.  These hospitals are supposed to 
compete in the health service market to improve efficiency and control costs. In this case, 
hospital managers and physicians rather than the local government are more likely to be 
residual claimants for public hospitals. In this sense, the stake of local government for 
public hospitals may decrease with public hospital reform. 
 
In addition to the role of local government in the health service provision, the fiscal 
pressure is also likely to affect the way local governments operate the social health 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
other local civil servants’ salaries and various investment projects from local hospitals’ accounts (Xinhua News 
Agency 2006). 
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insurance plans for which they are responsible, since the net expenditure or revenue from 
these plans also has a negative or positive effect on the local government’s budget. An 
important factor in this context are the matching grants that are given to local government 
from central and provincial governments when they enroll members in the social health 
insurance plans. The matching grants are at least three times larger than individual 
enrollee’s premium contributions. (The ratio is at least 40:10 between matching grants 
and individual contribution for rural health insurance plans. A similar ratio applies for 
urban resident plans; see Blomqvist and Qian 2008a, Ministry of Health 2006A). To get 
closer to universal coverage of social health insurance plans, the central government has 
increased the matching grants in 2008 (matching grants for rural plans and urban resident 
plans  are 80 Yuan per person per year from 2008; see Xinhua News Agency 2007A).  
Matching grants will be increased further to 120 Yuan per person from 2010 (Xinhua 
News Agency 2009). For local government, especially in central and western regions, 
these transfers via social health insurance can be very important. Subsidies from upper 
level governments for social health insurance of the 2008 standard would be equivalent to 
around 18% of local fiscal revenue for an average county in eastern region, and 44%  and  
42% for counties in the central and western regions22.  
 
From the literature, however, it is a common practice that (earmarked) transfers from 
higher level governments can be diverted for more pressing needs by local governments 
(Lin, et al. 2006 and Liu, et al. 2009) 23. Hence, in the context of health sector, it is in the 
                                                            
22 Calculated from counties’ fiscal revenue in the year 2004; see http://www.china-county.org/zonglan/zonglan19.asp. 
Also see Qian (2010) for a discussion of health expenditure and fiscal capacity for local governments in different 
regions,  
23 For example, transfers can be allocated to cover payrolls of local officials. 
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interest of local governments to increase the number of enrollees in the social health 
insurance plans in order to take advantage of these matching grants to improve their fiscal 
situation (Han and Luo 2007:138, Zhou 2004 Chap 5). Indeed, it has been observed 
recently that some local governments actually paid for individuals’ required premium 
contributions to the social health insurance plans in order to achieve a high enrollment 
rate and gain access to the matching-grant subsidies from higher level governments (Gu, 
et al. 2006:180, Wagstaff 2007). The incentive on local government decision-makers to 
increase enrollment in the social insurance plans may be further strenghtened to the 
extent that the central government views this as a valuable objective in itself, and lets 
local decision-makers know that their ability to accomplish this will be viewed as a 
favorable performance indicator for promotion, etc. While we do not incorporate this 
possibility in our formal analysis, such an incentive would just reinforce the monetary 
incentives that local governments have to favor social insurance plan enrollment. 
 
Although the net revenue or expenditure from publicly owned health care providers and 
the social insurance plans affect the fiscal situation of local governments, the way these 
institutions are managed may reflect other considerations and objectives as well. It is a 
common practice that the same local health bureau manages the social health insurance 
fund and public health service providers, particularly in rural areas (e.g., Gu, et al. 
2006:230; Han and Luo 2007:144). However, hospitals are not directly managed by the 
officials in the health bureaus, but by the hospitals’ managers and, to some extent, by the 
doctors who work in them. In general, it may not be possible for local governments to 
make hospital managers and doctors make decisions in a way that corresponds exactly to 
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the objectives of the local government’s financial officials. Similar considerations may 
apply to the local officials who manage the social insurance plans, though perhaps not to 
the same extent. In the formal analysis in the next section, we will make the simplifying 
assumption that the management of the social insurance plans is done in a way that 
corresponds to the objectives of the local government’s finance officials, but that hospital 
managers and doctors are to some extent independent and can only be induced to behave 
in a way that reflects the local government’s objectives if they have an incentive to do so.  
 
Finally, as briefly noted above, the local government also has another potentially 
important role in China’s health financing system (especially in urban areas), namely as 
the regulator of the private health insurance market (e.g., regulation of conditions of entry 
of private plans in the health insurance market, regulations that affect the scope for 
opportunistic behavior of physicians toward patients in private insurance plans, or 
restrictions on the extent of integration between hospitals and private insurers). In the 
following analysis, the way we model the local government’s use of its regulatory tools 
with respect to private insurance will play an important role, as it will influence the 
ability of private insurance plans to compete with social insurance, and hence indirectly 
to influence the net cost to the local government of funding hospitals and the social 
insurance plan.  
 
The rest of paper is arranged as follows. Section 2 introduces the environment and model 
specifications.  Section 3 characterizes market equilibriums in this model and section 4 
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indentifies local government’s responses to market equilibriums and parameter changes. 
Section 5 concludes the essay. 
 
Section 2: Modeling local governments’ behavior in the health sector 
A number of assumptions are possible if one wants to model the behaviour of local 
government financial decision-makers. For example, in a system where local officials are 
elected by well-informed voters in regularly held free elections, one might assume that 
their objective would be to maximize their chances of being re-elected, in which case a 
reasonable assumption would be that they would behave in such a way as to maximize 
the welfare of a representative citizen (for example, the median voter), subject to a fiscal 
constraint. However, for the reasons we have discussed above, we believe that, given the 
fiscal pressure on China’s local governments, a more realistic assumption would be that 
their principal objective is to raise as much government revenue as possible. Thus the 
following analysis makes the assumption that they use the tools they have available to 
manage the social health insurance plans and the hospital sector, and to regulate private 
insurance plans, in such a way as to maximize net government revenue, rather than 
citizen welfare24.   
 
To be concrete, we model the local government’s health-sector related revenue as 
including the net revenue from the local social insurance plan as well as an off budget 
                                                            
24 It is interesting to compare our assumption with the budget maximization assumption that reflects the objectives in 
the bureaucracy in Niskanen (1971), or the perception in Oi (1999), in which the objective of local cadres is to 
maximize the revenue of the local economy as a whole. Tao and Yang (2008) also argue that local government is 
driven by the revenue imperative. 
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item consisting of a share of the net revenues of health services providers. Net revenue 
from the social insurance plans is defined as transfers from higher-level governments plus 
required premium contributions from the insured, minus benefits paid. Both transfers 
from higher-level governments and required premium contributions from the insured are 
considered as parameters fixed by the state. But local governments set regulations 
regarding the terms under which benefits will be paid the insured.  
 
We only include a portion of the profits (net revenue) of health services providers for the 
following reason. Day-to-day decisions in hospital are delegated to managers/physicians.  
It is more efficient for local government to give physicians and managers an incentive to 
maximize profits (rather than, for example, to pay them fixed salaries). This principle is 
similar to those underlying the practices that have been used when reforming State 
Owned Enterprises, given monitoring and information difficulties for state officials.  In 
this sense, local governments and physicians/managers are sharing profits.  
 
While local governments can control the profit-sharing arrangements with hospitals to 
some extent, the local health bureaus are also subject to supervision by provincial and 
higher-level governments. The degree of profit-sharing between the local government 
and the hospitals could, in principle, either be treated as a parameter under the control of 
the local government or as being set by governments at higher level. In this paper, we 
will choose the latter interpretation and treat the degree of cost sharing between the 
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hospital and the local government as a parameter that effectively is set by upper-level 
government (the state)25. 
 
Given the parameters determined by the state, local governments then try to maximize 
their health-sector related net revenue by choosing the parameters they control. One is the 
level of reimbursement of insured costs under the social insurance plan. Another relates 
to the ability of the local government to influence the extent to which private insurance 
can compete with the social insurance plans, as discussed above, through regulation and 
in other ways. In the paper, the local government’s strategy in this respect is represented 
by a single parameter which increases in value as the local government’s policies toward 
private insurance become more restrictive. 
 
Given the above assumptions concerning the parameters controlled by the state and local 
government, the remainder of the paper contains an analysis of a model which describes 
the determination of health services utilization and expenditure in an environment where 
private insurance competes with social health insurance plans given these parameters, and 
where local government chooses its parameters so as to maximize its net health-sector 
related revenue. Using such a model, we are able to predict the consequences of changing 
the parameters representing central government health policy. By doing so, we hope to 
contribute to the debate concerning the important health policy decisions that must be 
made at the central government level over the next several years, and how these decisions 
                                                            
25 For example, the blueprint of the ongoing public hospital reform in year 2010 in 16 pilot cities is under close 
supervision of five ministries. See an official report http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2010-
02/23/content_13033644.htm. 
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should take into account the decentralized nature of both health policy and public finance 
in contemporary China.  Our analysis of the effects of changing various parameters, 
therefore, can be interpreted as giving information about the way higher-level 
governments can influence the way local government will manage the health care system. 
Under this interpretation of the local government’s behavior, our analysis focuses on how 
the incentives of local government will affect the local health sector’s structure. In 
particular, we consider how the local government will use its regulatory powers, and the 
terms of the social insurance plans in the face of potential competition from private health 
insurance plans.  
 
2.1: Literature review 
Traditional literature on fiscal federalism is to consider the tradeoff between 
decentralization, which has the advantage of being more responsive to local information, 
and centralization, which is better able to take into account spillover effects (Oates 1999). 
Interests of local and central governments are not fully discussed in this literature. We are 
looking at this issue from the perspective of political economics, interpreting the 
interaction between central and local governments as an agency problem where local 
government has its own interests. From the political economics of trade literature, 
Branstetter and Feenstra (2002) consider that local and central government set economic 
policy by balancing various interest groups including foreign firms, local firms and 
consumers. Tsui and Wang (2008) discussed the behavior of local cadres under the 
current inter-governmental system of public finance. In their paper, local cadres have to 
consider a tradeoff between providing public goods and exploiting off budget revenue by 
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collecting fees from local people to stay in power. Chen (2004) discusses the distortion of 
incentives on local government after the fiscal reform in middle 1990’s, which reduced 
the tax base of local government and increased the central government’s fiscal power. 
Consequently, local cadres were more likely to be involved in corruption than under the 
previous fiscal regime.  Like these two papers, we are also interested in inter-government 
fiscal relationships and in the opportunistic behaviors of local government decision-
makers. However, our paper is different from the existing literature by focusing on local 
government’s behavior in the health sector in the context of ongoing health reform, and 
by paying attention to both government financing and provision of health services, and to 
the competition between public and private insurance. Enthoven (1993) proposes the 
principles of managed competition among multiple health insurance plans. Blomqvist 
(2002; forthcoming) discussed different ways to finance health in some developed 
countries, in particular, through private-public mixture in both health insurance and 
health provision (e.g., U.S. Medicare system and UK NHS system). Blomqvist (2009) 
also discusses from a normative perspective the role that private insurance can play, 
given the current Chinese health system. Following the literature of managed competition 
in health economics literature, we analyze the interaction of three parties (social and 
private insurers, service providers and patients) in our theoretical framework.  
 
2.2: Model specification 
In this section, we specify a simple quantitative model to analyze a local government’s 
strategic behavior with respect to social health insurance and health services provision.  
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We focus on the voluntary social health insurance plans which cover farmers, migrant 
workers, self-employed, people working in the informal sector, and dependents etc26. 
Local government receives matching grants annually from the state for every enrollee of 
these plans, as well as membership fees (premiums) collected from those who enroll in 
the plans. Consumers can choose either social or private insurance. For simplicity, we 
consider the case where there only is a single social insurance plan, which we refer to as 
the “public plan”. The private plans may cover some drugs or services which are not 
covered in the public plan. In our model, each person can only register either in a private 
plan or in the social health insurance (public) plan. Thus, the public and private plans are 
substitutes27 and competing for enrollees28.  
  
Local government sets local policy for the social insurance plan (the public plan) as well 
as rules that govern conditions of entry and other aspects of private insurance. We 
assume that local government (rather than the central government) can set at least some 
of these rules. In deciding on their policy parameters, local governments take the 
parameters set by the central government as fixed. They also take into account the 
behavior of citizens who choose which insurance plan (the public plan or a private one) 
                                                            
26 Currently, rural social health insurance plans and urban resident plans are voluntary and eligible for matching grants, 
whereas the basic urban employee plan is compulsory for employers and hence does not compete with private 
insurance.  We do not consider the basic urban employee plan in this paper. In the future, however, our model may be 
applicable to the situation where employers could “opt out” of the social health insurance plan to join private health 
insurance plans, if this will be allowed.  
27 Usage of the terms “substitute private insurance” follows OECD terminology. See (Colombo and Tapay, 2004). 
28 If social health insurance plans are compulsory, social and private insurance plans could be complements to each 
other if private plans are allowed to “top up” the coverage of the public plans (Jack 1999:287). However, we do not 
consider complementary (“top-up”) private insurance in this paper, only private insurance that substitutes for the public 
plan. 
                                                                                              83 
 
to enroll in, and the treatment methods that physicians choose and the fees they will 
charge, for patients with different insurance status.  
 
2.3: Objectives of Local government: 
As noted above, in the traditional public finance literature it is sometimes assumed that 
the government’s objective is to maximize the representative citizen’s welfare for a given 
budget. However, based on the considerations in our previous discussion, we assume an 
ideal type for local governments which maximizes its own net revenue rather than social 
welfare, given the institutional context in China today29.  
 
Local government’s financial resources include a portion of profits generated by local 
hospitals as well as the net revenue from operating the public social insurance plan. 
Therefore, we can write the local government’s objective function as follows: 
snTGSL  )( 
       
Here,   is the share of public hospitals’ aggregate profit   which accrues as net (off-
budget) revenue to the local government (0< <1). When   =0, providers are effectively 
the residual claimants (net profits of the hospital accrues to the managers/staff as bonuses, 
etc.), while   =1 refers to the case when local government is the effective residual 
                                                            
29 For a debate on the role of government between leading figures in the public choice and public finance literature, see 
Buchanan and Musgrave (1999). Our approach is closer in spirit to that of Buchanan.  
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claimant. We assume an intermediate case with the value of   located between 0 and 1, 
to reflect the idea that managers/physicians in the hospitals are given an incentive to 
maximize profits, since they share profits with the local government. As we have 
mentioned previously,   is an exogenous given institutional parameter to denote the 
degree of hospital independence. In this paper, we take it as a parameter controlled by 
central government policy. We also impose a restriction that there is no side payment 
between public hospitals and the local government. 
 
 S is the lump-sum subsidy that the health bureau of the local government receives from 
upper level governments, which depends on the number of employees or capacity (e.g., 
number of beds) of health services providers, but not on the quantity of services. Again 
we interpret S as a parameter controlled by the central government.   
 
G  denotes the amount of matching grant per person insured in the public plan that 
received from upper level governments.   is the premium contribution that each 
individual pays to register in the public plan. T  is the average amount of reimbursement 
per enrollee under the public plan. Therefore TG   denotes the net revenue of the 
local government from the social insurance fund for each enrollee and sn  is the number 
of enrollees who are covered by the public plan. In the analysis below, we will consider 
both G and   as determined by the central government, but T is an endogenous variable 
which is influenced by local government policy. 
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In the next section, we are going to study the market equilibrium in both health insurance 
and health services markets, with given local parameters for the public plan and for the 
regulatory strategy toward private insurance. Then, we look backward to determine the 
local government’s optimal strategy, given the market equilibrium for local providers, 
consumers, and private insurers.  
 
We focus on two key local government strategies. First, we characterize to what degree 
local government encourages or discourages entry of private insurers in the local health 
insurance market. We do so by introducing a variable that represents the local 
government’s efforts to discourage private insurance by imposing various kinds of 
regulation. For example, it has been reported that some local governments force 
employers to buy complementary social insurance plans for serious illness for their 
employees. This gives a smaller potential role for private insurers in the health insurance 
market30. We may interpret this effort as a degree of local discretion for health insurance 
regulation31. Second, we also study how local government adjusts the local 
reimbursement rate for the public plan under different parameter configurations. We use 
this rate as a proxy for the attractiveness of the public plan: The higher the 




30 See http://finance.sina.com.cn/money/insurance/bxsd/20070516/09163597393.shtml.   
31 Tsui and Wang (2008) use a similar variable to interpret local discretion on charging fees for off budget revenue. 
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Section 3: Market Equilibrium: 
In our model, the payment method for local providers (hospitals) is fee-for-service while 
insurers reimburse patients with a proportion of the fees they have been charged. We 
assume that patients can choose among many providers, but that all of them are 
government-owned. We also assume that the market for health services provision is 
monopolistically competitive, as it could be in a city/county with several competing 
hospitals. There are m providers. Individual providers choose treatment methods and fees 
so as to maximize expected profits from each patient, given his/her insurance status, and 
taking into account the possibility that the patient can go to another provider if he/she is 
dissatisfied with the cost or proposed treatment. Profits of public providers consist of 
profits from providing services to enrollees of both the public plan and private insurance 
plans, as well as to people with no insurance.  
 
There are price controls applied to a range of basic health services/drugs in China (Yip 
and Mahal 2008). These regulated health services/drugs belong to the essential 
services/drugs lists applicable to the public plan. We use p  to denote a price index for 
regulated services/drugs. Currently, only services/drugs included in the essential lists are 
eligible to be reimbursed from social insurance plans (Ministry of Health 2004B), but 
doctors may advice patients to utilize services or drugs that are not on the eligibility list. 
If they do so, patients have to pay for these services and drugs out of pocket but cannot 
claim any reimbursement. The expected revenue that providers collect from patients with 
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different insurance status will depend on the level at which prices of regulated drugs and 






p the expected amounts of average net revenue per patient earned 
by providers for treating people registered in public and private insurance plans 




p are different because different plans attract 
different kinds of enrollees and more importantly because services and reimbursement 
rates in different plans may be different. We assume that 
s
p  is less than 
p
p since 
private insurance can cover higher end drugs and services. 
n
p  is the optimal amount of 
average net revenue per patient received by providers for treating those who are not 
insured. We assume that 
n
p  is much less than 
p
p (also less than 
s
p  ) since uninsured 
people are more sensitive to price and may search healthcare from providers in other 
cities. We assume that providers are identical, so that the total amount of revenue that 
each receives from treating people enrolled in the different insurance plans (or patients 
without insurance) is proportional to the total number of people in each insurance status 
category.   
 
We denote by k the reimbursement rate under the social insurance plan, i.e., k is the share 
of the cost of eligible health services (those with regulated prices) that patients can claim 
from the public plan. Since health service market is competitive, the expected revenue sp  
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from treating patients enrolled in the public plan would generally depend on k, but np   or 
pp  would not be affected by changes of reimbursement rate k. pn  is the number of 
enrollees who are covered by private insurance and nn  is the number of uninsured. We 
also assume that the private health insurance market is competitive.  
 
Given sn  and pn  together with  public and private insurance policies, providers’ 
strategies with respect to treatment methods and fee setting would determine the average 
amounts of net revenue received from patients in the different insurance status categories. 
We write the outcome of these decisions as the following reduced forms:  
),(* ppp nppp           (2.1) 
),(* kppp ss           (2.2) 
)(* ppp nn            (2.3) 
Since centrally determined price controls for certain treatment methods and drugs affect 




p as functions of the index for controlled prices, 
and assume that they are increasing in the price index p . The function ),( pp npp  
denotes that optimal net revenue for providers from each enrollee in private insurance 
plans is a function of the total number of enrollees in private insurance plans and 





p  , reflecting the idea that pn  
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affects the bargaining power of private insurers: The more people who are registering 
under private plans, the higher the bargaining power of private insurers, and therefore the 
lower the average cost of care for those enrolled in private plans. Implicitly, therefore, we 
are assuming that private insurers act like managed care plans in the U.S., negotiating 
terms regarding fees and treatment methods with health services providers in a way that 
reduces the average cost of care for their clients32. The function ),( kpp s denotes that net 
revenue from enrollees under the public plan depends on price index p  and 
reimbursement rate k.33 
 
Enrollment in the different insurance plans (or the decision to remain uninsured) is 
determined by consumers: consumers make their choice of insurance status. They make 
their choice based on the expected cost of health care under each plan, which depends 
both on the premium of the plan, and the expected out-of-pocket cost of treatment (that is, 
net of insurance reimbursement) for those who became ill. For those in the public plan, 
the out of pocket cost is determined both by sp , the average amount charged by 
physicians, and the reimbursement rate k. We use sz  to denote the expected out-of-
pocket expenditure of health care under the public plan; sz  is increasing with *sp  and 
decreasing with the reimbursement rate k. For private plans, we assume that both the 
premium and reimbursement rate in equilibrium are functions of *pp  so that enrolment in 
private insurance can be written as a function of  *pp  only.  The numbers of enrollees 
                                                            
32 In U.S. context, there is plenty of evidence that larger insurers can get bigger discounts (Dranove and Satterthwaite 
2000).  
33We do not consider the issue of cost shifting between private and public plans here.  
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under each insurance plan in equilibrium, and the number of consumers without 
insurance, can then be written as: 
),,),,(( **** pnssss ppkpznn  .       (2.4) 
),,,),,(( **** eppkpznn pnsspp  .       (2.5) 
*** psn nnNn  .         (2.6) 
where N  denotes the total number of consumers, and where σ (defined above) is the 
consumer’s premium in the public plan. The variable e in equation (2.5) is an index 
representing the effort level of local government as a regulator to discourage private 
insurer: The higher the value of e , the more restrictive the regulations that local 
government imposes on private insurers. Accordingly, we postulate that 0

e
n p .  
 
We make the following further assumptions:  sn is decreasing with *sp  while increasing 
with *np  and *pp . A higher *pp  would reduce the number of enrollees under private 
plans pn  while a higher *sp  would increase the number of enrollees under private plans 









. This assumption reflects the 
expectation that providers are aware of whether or not a patient is insured in the social 
insurance plan, and tend to charge higher fees (and recommend more expensive types of 
treatment) to such patients when the degree of coverage in the public plan increases.   
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We also assume that 0
dk
dz s , which implies that out-of-pocket expenditure will decrease 


























p s , 0
dk
dz s . 
 
If we substitute equations (2.1), (2.2) and (2.3), into the above demand functions (2.4) 
and (2.5), we have the following reduced form demand functions that depend only on the 
exogenous parameters of the problem: 
),,,(* ekpfn ss  .         (2.7)  
),,,(* ekpfn pp  .         (2.8)  
Given the assumptions we have made, the signs of the derivatives of the demand 
functions with respect to the individual parameters can now be determined from 
equations (2.1)-(2.8).  
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denotes the marginal change in the number of population without insurance as the 
regulations on private insurance becomes more restrictive. This marginal change must be 
non-negative since private insurance becomes less attractive while the public plan is 
unchanged; consequently, no consumer who previously was without insurance would 
find it attractive to join either plan, implying  0

e
nn .  































































To prove that 0
dk
dns , note first that the item in the bracket: is negative. From equation 









































n .   We get a similar result regarding the marginal changes of 





n . Then, from 0
dk
dz s , we have 
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dk
dns >0 and 0
dk
dn p . 
dk
dnn <0 since an increasing k implies an increasing opportunity 
cost of staying uninsured. 
 
From the assumptions and results above, we can find the signs of the derivatives of the 













































follows from the previous result that 0
dk
dn p .   
 
Section 4: The local government’s strategy 
From the viewpoint of providers, patients, and private insurers, the reimbursement rate k 
and the regulatory variable e are parameters to which they respond. From the viewpoint 
of local governments, however, these are their decision variables. We can now look at 
how local governments set the values of these variables in response to the behavior of 
providers and patients, and to the exogenous parameters of the problem such as those set 
by the state. First we analyze their decisions one at a time, holding the other variable 
constant. Later we look at the case where both parameters are determined simultaneously.  
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      (2.9)
 
where   
i
ii np ,    i = s, p, n 
0),(  kpTG s  .       (2.10) 
Average transfers to reimburse patients T increase with sp  and k. However,  ),( kpT s  is 
not simply equal to skp  because some services/drugs, which are not on essential 
drug/services lists, are not reimbursable. Therefore, ),( kpT s  is less than skp .  
 
),( kpTG s  denotes the average net revenue per enrollee to local governments from 
the social insurance fund.  We assume that it is required to be non-negative by the central 
government (that is, the fund is not allowed to run a deficit). 
 
We first consider the optimum value for e. Substituting equations (2.7) and (2.8) into 











     (2.11) 
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n sp ,        
It is possible that the optimal effort level would cause the equilibrium to be located at a 









 >0 when pn =0. Neither of these cases is of 
interest. We only focus on the case where there is an interior solution for an optimal e 
here. 
 







of the sum in the first term (which is negative), it represents the marginal cost to the local 
government resulting from the decrease in the number of enrollees in the private plan as 
the local government raises e (imposes more restrictive regulations on private insurance).  
 













  )()(  can be interpreted as the marginal 












  is the benefit from increased enrollment in the public plan and 
increasing the number of uninsured people.  )( TG
e
ns 
  is the net benefit that the 
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government realizes through the public plan, in the form of increased transfers from the 







  denotes marginal benefit after raising e, due to the higher net 
revenue from patients under private insurances. This higher net revenue can be explained by 
increasing bargaining power of service providers after raising e via a lower pn . After 
rearranging (2.11), we can also imply that in an interior equilibrium, the marginal effect 








 ).   
 
For an interior optimum, the marginal cost must be equal to the net marginal benefit. We 



















 and 10   .  
 
The larger   is, the more effective is the local government’s effort to attract enrollees to 
social plans by making regulations on private insurance more restrictive. We define the 






e . Under certain 
conditions (e.g., when   is close to one, the case where all those who leave a private plan 
join the public plan instead), the equation simplifies to: 










1        (2.12) 
From equation (2.12), we can see that sp pp   must hold in order to have an interior 
equilibrium. The other implication from equation (2.11) is that in an interior equilibrium, 








 ).   
 
We next turn to the determination of the optimal value of k, the reimbursement rate under 
the public plan (recall that in the paper we interpret it as a proxy for the quality of the 
public-plan coverage).  Differentiating (2.9), taking into account the constraint (2.7), we 






















L nnppssppssss   (2.13)   













   
Analogous to the first order condition for e, it is possible that the optimal reimbursement 
rate would cause the equilibrium to be located at either the boundary where pn =0 or 
where Nn p  . However, we continue to focus on the case of interior solutions here.  
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Given the earlier results, we have 0

k
p p .  0
dk










p s . We already know from the previous discussion of market equilibrium condition 
that 
dk
dns >0 and 
dk
dn p <0. 
 











   denotes the net marginal benefit 
from changing the number of enrollees in the public plan (and the number without 




s  is the benefit from increasing enrollees in 











 is the incremental benefit to providers from 
increasing the revenue per patient in the public plan and for people privately insured, 
which is multiplied by the local government’s share  . The term )( TG
dk
dns   is the 
marginal benefit to the local government through its impact on the public plan of 
increasing the number of enrollees in it. 
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  denotes costs from decreasing pn  and nn . The item 
dk
dTns   
denotes the costs of benefits paid out by the public plan after increasing k.  
 
We may interpret the local government‘s optimization problem as selecting the best 
policy combination to maximize total revenue. Local government chooses an optimal 
policy combination taking into account a trade-off between revenue from public hospitals 
and subsidies from the public plan. Efforts to discourage private insurance will attract 
more enrollees to the social insurance plan, but will also reduce the profits public 
hospitals can earn by treating privately insured patients. On the other hand, an increase in 
the public plan’s reimbursement rate will attract more people to visit hospitals and 
potentially increase hospital profits. However, at same time, an increase in the 
reimbursement rate will reduce the surplus of the insurance fund.   
 
4.1: Comparative statics I: Local government’s response to raising state subsidies to 
social insurance 
We can now consider the way local governments will respond to changes in various 
exogenous parameters, including those fixed by the central government, and how the 
market equilibrium is affected by these reactions. We start with looking at the effects of 
changing the parameter G, which represents the level of state subsidies to the public plan. 
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To see how a change in G will affect k, the proxy for the quality of the social insurance 













         
(2.14)  
It is necessary to have an optimal value k so that the second order conditions for the value 





L )..  From the earlier discussion, we know that the numerator 
is positive, implying that the total derivative is positive. In other words, the local 
government will increase the reimbursement rate k  (raise the quality of the public plan) if 
the central government increases the matching grant G. Intuitively, increasing the 
matching grants makes enrolling consumers in the public plan more rewarding to the 
local government, so it would have an incentive to increase the reimbursement rate to 




k . With increased matching grants, local government would increase the 
reimbursement rate of the public plan in order to attract people currently without 
insurance. 
 
Proposition 1: With e fixed, if the state tries to encourage wider coverage of the public 
plan through increasing matching grants, local governments will increase the quality of 
the public plan in order to attract more enrollees to it.   
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Next we consider the impact of a change in G on the regulatory variable e. Differentiating 

















         
(2.15)  
When e is chosen so as to maximize the objective function L, the second order derivative 





L ). Given that 0

e






That is, if the central government increases the matching grants for enrollees under the 
public plan, local governments will be more restrictive in regulating private insurers. 
Intuitively, an increase in the matching grants makes it more profitable for local 
governments to bring about increased enrollment in the public plan. One way to 
accomplish this is by using regulatory measures to discourage private insurances, so that 
the public plan faces less competition from private plans. 
Proposition 2: With a fixed k, if the state tries to encourage wider coverage of the public 
plan by increasing the matching grant G, local governments will exert more effort to 
discourage private insurers. 
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Interaction effects 
In the discussion so far, we have considered the comparative statics effects on the local 
government’s decision variables one at a time. In principle, the propositions derived 
above may not be valid in the general case where the local government chooses optimal 
values for these variables simultaneously, since there may be interaction effects. What 
would happen if local government could control both discouraging effort e and the 
reimbursement rate k? This is the case close to the reality of contemporary China, where 
local government determines both as local health policies. 
 
 
Now, we could derive two first order conditions from objective function which are 
equations (2.11) and (2.13). We do comparative statics on equations (2.11) and (2.13) by 



















H   is the determinant of the Hessian matrix of second order derivatives 
and cross derivatives. The expression L with subscripts here denotes second order 
derivatives. From the second-order condition for a maximum, we know that H>0.  
Furthermore, we have cross partial derivatives: 























The sign of keL cannot be determined.  The reason is that at the optimal levels e and k, if 
there is increase in k, the marginal effect of e on local government’s revenue can be 
increased or decreased. In more detail, the marginal effect of e over government transfers 
and individual contributions for the public plan may increase with k. But the marginal 
effect of e over expenditure for reimbursing patients may increase with k also at the same 
time. Which effect is larger depends on the shape of the demand functions for the 
insurance plans. Similar logic can be applied to the marginal effect of e and k on hospital 




L2 0) if increasing one of the policy variables enhances marginal 









 >0.  In this case, with a higher matching grant G, local 
government would increase the reimbursement rate and pursue more restrictive policies 
toward private insurance. As we have assumed in previous discussions that e has an 
interior solution, the rest of comparative statics on parameter G and   would be the same 
as the results under Proposition 2.  
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Local insurance policies are substitutes (i.e., 

ek
L2 0) ) if increasing one of the policy 
variables reduce marginal revenue for local government with respect to the other policy. 








  cannot be determined.  
We can prove, however, that both these derivatives cannot be negative at the same time. 
In other words, when increasing government transfers, either k or e will increase. To 














and rearranging, we have 
0)( 2  kkeeke LLL , which is contradictory to second order condition of the maximization 
problem. Hence, either k or e increases with G.  
 
Proposition 3: If the state tries to encourage wider coverage of the public plan by 
increasing the matching grants, local governments will exert more effort e to discourage 
private insurers and raise the quality of the public plan (i.e., increasing k) if these two 
policy instruments are complements.  In the case when they are substitutes, e and k will 
not both decrease as a result of an increase in G. 
 
We may interpret Proposition 3 as that the local government will increase both policy 
variables if they are reinforcing each other to attract enrollees the public plan. If these 
two policy variables are offsetting each other’s effect to attract enrollees for the public 
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plan, the local government must make sure that these policy variables move in opposite 
directions to increase enrollees for the public plan. 
 
4.2: Comparative statics II: Local government’s response to public hospital reform:   
In the paper, the parameter α represents the degree to which local government’s fiscal 
condition is influenced by the net revenues earned by hospitals (health services providers). 
Suppose, for example, that hospitals incur deficits. If local government is fully 
responsible for these deficits, and the compensation of hospital managers or doctors is 
independent of the size of the hospital’s deficit, one has α=1. On the other hand, if any 
deficit is partially covered by upper-level governments, and the compensation of 
managers and hospital doctors is partially dependent on the size of the deficit, the value 
of α may be substantially less than one. 
 
The value of α depends in part on rules regarding the responsibilities of local government 
that are set at the central level. For this reason, we regard α as a central-government 
control variable in this paper. In this section, therefore, we look at the question how local 
government behavior (as represented by the variables k and e) will be influenced by 
changes in α. We may interpret this change of parameter as a result of public hospital 
reform, which may be because of either more autonomy for the public hospital (i.e., a 
lower α ) or increasing the fiscal subsidy to public hospitals (i.e., a higher α).  As in the 
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previous section, we begin by considering its effects on local government policy with 
respect to the quality of the public plan, as represented by the variable k. 
 



































 <0, the sign of d
dk  is identical to the sign of the numerator on the left-hand-






















, which is the marginal net revenue for 
hospitals when increasing k. The sign of 
k
  cannot be determined. A bigger k raises 
provider’s profits from those covered by the public plan, but the profit will decrease from 
those covered by private insurance. In other words the sign of d
dk  is positive if the 
hospital’s profit increases with k and negative if the hospital’s profit decreases with k. 
 
Proposition 4: With e fixed, if public hospitals are operated less independently and the 
local government becomes more fully responsible for provider deficits (i.e.,  becomes 
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larger), local government will increase the quality of the public plan (i.e., increasing k) if 
and only if such an increase will raise hospitals’ profit.    
 
Proposition 4 could be interpreted as saying that with a higher stake in providers’ profits 
or losses, the local government will adjust the quality of the public plan by changing the 
reimbursement rate. If an increase in k raises the hospitals’ profits (because they will earn 
more revenue from patients in the social insurance plan), this is the best strategy. 
However, when e is fixed, the number of enrollees under private insurance plans may 
increase with a lower reimbursement rate for the public plan. Local governments’ 
revenue, via hospitals’ profit, may then increase with the number of enrollees under 
private insurance plans. If this effect is strong enough, the government’s best strategy 
may be to decrease k when its stake in the hospital’s profit rises. However, if public 
hospitals have more autonomy after hospital reform (i.e.,  becomes smaller), we can 
imply from Proposition 4 that the local government will decrease the quality of the public 
plan. 
 
Next we look at the comparative statics with respect to parameter   when local 
















        (2.19)  
From equation (2.11), the numerator on the left-hand-side of equation (2.19) is:  


















From the constraint (2.10) and given that 0

e
ns  and 0 , the numerator on the left-





Proposition 5: With k fixed, if public hospitals are operated less independently (i.e., α 
becomes larger), local government will be less restrictive in its regulation of private 
health insurance.    
 
Proposition 5 could be interpreted as that with a higher stake in providers’ profits, the 
local government is less likely to discourage private insurance, because more private 
insurance will raise provider revenue. Intuitively, for the local government, the number of 
enrollees under private insurance plans will increase with less discouragement effort for 
private health insurance. Consequently, local government revenue via hospital profit will 
increase with the number of enrollees under private insurance plans. Again, if public 
hospitals enjoy more autonomy after hospital reform (i.e.,  becomes smaller), we can 
imply from Proposition 5 that the local government will be more restrictive in its 
regulation of private health insurance.    
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Interaction effects 
As before, the comparative statics effects of a change in the parameter α may be different 
when we consider both of local government’s instruments simultaneously. From 














































From (2.11), we have 0eL . As we have discussed previously, the sign of kL  and keL  






e . If 
local government has a higher stake in provider’s profits, local government would 
decrease k to reduce reimbursement to patients. This would happen both because this 
would increase net revenue from the public plan directly, and because it would increase 
provider revenue from people covered by private insurance. 
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If kL > 0 and 0keL , the sign of 
k and 
e  cannot be determined.  However, using 
arguments similar to those in the previous section, we can show that 0






could not both hold since this would contradict the second order condition for a 
maximum. 
 
Similarly, if kL <0 and 0keL , the sign of 
k and 
e  cannot be determined. However, 
again we know that 0


k  and 0


e  could not both hold from second order 
condition. If 0kL , the sign of 





If kL 0 and 0keL , 
k is positive and 
e  is negative. kL >0 implies that an 
increasing   requires an increasing k. Similarly, since k and e are substitutes when 
0keL , an increasing   requires an increasing e. The usage of instruments such as k or 
e to increase enrollment in the public plan (and hence increase the amount of transfers 
from upper level governments) would decrease with a larger in this case. 
 
Proposition 6:  If public hospitals are operated less independently (that is, α becomes 
larger), under certain conditions (i.e., 0kL  and 0keL ), local government  will 
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increase the quality of the public plan (raise k) and pursue less restrictive policies with 
respect to the entry of private insurers (decrease e).  
 
We may interpret Proposition 6 as that local government will increase the quality of the 
public plan and pursue less restrictive policies toward private insurance if these strategies 
reinforce each other to increase public hospital’s profits. If these two policy variables 
instead have offsetting effects of each other, the local government must make sure that 
these policy variables move opposite directions to increase public hospital’s profits.  In 
this case, if public hospitals have more autonomy after hospital reform (i.e.,  becomes 
smaller), we can imply from Proposition 6 that the local government will reduce quality 
of the public plan and pursue more restrictive policies for private insurances. 
 
4.3: Comparative statics III: results for other parameters  
In the discussion above, we have also assumed that the central government controls 
another parameter, namely the price index for the services and drugs included on the 
eligibility lists of the public plan (denoted by p in the model). If central government 
increases the price level of regulated services and drugs, the cost to local government of 
reimbursing patients in the public plan would increase. Hence, local government’s net 
revenue from the social insurance fund would decrease. However, revenue collected from 
providers would increase. The local government may increase or decrease k or e with p . 
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As before, we consider what changes of e and k would be expected as a result. From 











  is the same as the sign of peL . 
However, the sign of peL  is not determined. This is because an increase of p  may lead to 
an increase of fees and causes fewer people to register in the public plan, on the one hand.  









 >0 if 
peL >0.     
 












  is the same to sign of pkL . The sign of pkL  is not determined. An increase of p  




 <0.  If pkL >0, p
k

 >0. Intuitively, a larger p  will increase hospital’s profit. 
But fewer people will register for the public plan and for a given k, a larger amount of 
social insurance fund have to be reimbursed to patients. Hence, direction of movement of 
local health policies k or e, when p  changes, is ambiguous.  
 
The paper also assumes that the central government sets the rules that prescribe what the 
required premium contribution for enrollment in the public plan, σ, should be. The effect 
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of a change in   depends on the property of the demand functions for the voluntary 
public plan and private insurance. If the effect of   on the demand functions of the 
different insurance plans is small enough, the comparative statics results regarding   
would be equivalent to the results regarding a change in G, the transfers from upper-level 
governments to local government, per enrolled person. At the current stage of reform, it 
may be reasonable to expect that the effects are same in this sense since the required 
premiums in the voluntary public plan is set to be a small amount relative to the local 
























 .  
 
Therefore, the local government will increase the quality of the public plan or be more 
restrictive toward private insurance plans in response to an increase of individual 
contribution for the public plan.  
 
Finally, the subsidy for hospitals from upper level government S (which appears in the 
local government’s objective function) may be set as a decreasing function of the 
provider’s profit rather than a lump sum subsidy. In other words, there are more transfers 
if a hospital has a larger deficit. The rationale of this transfer is to make hospitals or local 
government less sensitive to market forces. Such an arrangement will dilute the marginal 
effect of    over local health policies. The marginal effect of G over local health policies 
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will nevertheless remain the same. The local government has the incentive to improve the 
quality of social insurance plans further or discourage private insurance plans.  
 
Section 5: Discussion and Implications  
Under recent approaches to Chinese health reform, upper-level governments have 
concentrated on trying to stimulate enrolment in the voluntary social insurance plans (in 
rural cooperative medical schemes, and in the urban residents’ plans) by increasing the 
level at which they subsidize enrollment in the local governments’ plans. From the results 
in this study, the prediction would be that increasing government transfers would give 
local governments the incentive to increase enrollment in the social insurance plans, 
which they could do either by raising the quality of their coverage, or by taking measures 
to restrict competition from private insurance plans (raising e). In extreme cases, the 
prediction may be for policies so restrictive that private insurance would essentially be 
excluded from local markets.  
 
Hence, we have an alternative explanation for the increasing reimbursement rate for local 
social insurance plans recently. The reimbursement rate is increased not because of the 
welfare concern of local government but as an effort to increase local revenue. 
Furthermore, from observed surpluses in the social insurances funds, we may predict that 
these surpluses may give local governments incentives to discourage private insurers. 
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Empirical evidence on the growth of private insurance in China confirms that there are 
very few substitute private health insurances. Because firms are afraid of potential entry 
barriers and the profitability is expected to be low, not many private insurers have been 
active. Revenue of private health insurance plans only accounts for 4% of total health 
expenditure in China in year 200934.  So far, there are only four companies whose core 
business in China is health insurance, and much of their activity has been as complements 
to the social insurance plans, which only cover same set of services and drugs as social 
insurance plans35. Our prediction also implies that there are surpluses in the social 
insurance funds.  It is reported that there are over 30% surpluses in total for voluntary 
social insurance funds (urban and rural plans) for the year 2008 (Gu 2010a, b)36. In 
March 2009, the Vice Minister of Supervision Qu Wanxiang suggested that much of this 
fund may be diverted for other purposes by local government. In addition, according to 
Minister Qu, some local governments even evaluate cadre’s performance by the amount 
of surplus in health insurance fund37.  
 
At the same time, efforts to reform the operation and management of hospitals have been 
going on since year 2000, resulting in a trend toward more autonomous operation of 
hospitals and hence a reduction in the degree to which local governments have an interest 
in their net revenue. Recent reform proposals have involved the ideas of operating 
                                                            
34 Total private health insurance premiums reached 57.4 Billion Yuan. See April 23, 2010, 21st century business herald.  
35 It is reported that the first private insurance package for supplementary insurance started from 2006. See 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/money/insurance/bxdt/20060228/18132379623.shtml. 
36 It is also reported by China Academy of Social Sciences that several counties surplus fund for rural health insurance 
fund is over 40%. See a report from (21th century Business Herald, Aug 14, 2007, downloadable from 
http://news.hexun.com/2007-08-14/100178086_1.html). 
37 This official report can be downloaded from http://medicine.people.com.cn/GB/8933975.html 
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hospitals as a “corporation” (Xinhua News Agency 2009) 38. In terms of our model, the 
trend toward more hospital autonomy can be interpreted both as a decrease in the value of 
the parameter  , as it would reduce the local government’s financial stake in the 
operating results of hospitals, and move closer to a situation in which hospital personnel 
(managers and doctors) would effectively become full residual claimants on hospital 
profits or losses. This could also happen as a result of measures such as local government 
leasing out public hospitals, or even selling them to managers or private investors.  
 
From our model, if public hospitals become more autonomous for the next round of 
reform, we may expect a further restriction on private insurance and less generous 
reimbursement rate from our model. However, the pattern of hospital reform is far from 
concrete at this moment.  In some cities, public hospital reform heads to a direction in 
which local governments strengthen their control over public hospitals (Qian 2009). In 
this case, local government becomes the de facto controller of residuals for public 
hospitals. Hence, the parameter  may increase after hospital reform. In this case, our 
prediction would be ambiguous. Local government may become less restrictive over 
private insurers and increase reimbursement rate further for social plans.   
 
Wilson (1989) observed that bureaucracies typically have multidimensional tasks and 
recent literature suggests that an optimal institutional design should give relatively low 
rewards to tasks that are easily measureable. In the context of health care sector, the most 
                                                            
38 See a recent interview of several heads of public owned hospitals on expected reform 
http://www.nanfangdaily.com.cn/ZM/20071122/jj/200711220031.asp 
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easily measurable task for bureaucracy at higher level government (e.g., central 
government) is to increase the subsidies for social health insurance coverage or to 
transform the governance structure of public hospital, while the less easily measurable 
ones have been to reduce the cost of episodes of care by encouraging competition 
between private and public insurers.  Incentives of bureaucracy in the higher level 
government may lead to an increasing matching grant and a large scale reform of hospital 
ownership/governance structure without taking into account responses from local 
government. 
 
One possible implication of our analysis, therefore, is that transfers from higher-level 
governments should not be allocated on the basis of social insurance enrollee numbers, 
but instead as a lump-sum for a government agency with responsibility to finance health 
care for a given population39.  Under such a system, there would be a stronger incentive 
on the local government to reduce the cost of care and fees that patients are charged, 
something that it could do by encouraging competition between private and public 
insurance.  
 
However, a system of lump-sum subsidies could also give rise to problems. It would 
imply what is referred to in the contract literature as a “low-powered” incentive structure, 
something that might put the local government health agency at risk for being “captured” 
(have their policies influenced) by various local interest groups. We leave further analysis 
                                                            
39 Blomqvist and Qian (2008b) discuss the feasibility for a single agency to act as the “purchasing agency” for both 
private and social insurance plans. 
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of this problem for future research. In general, increasing transfer and local tax power 
may not give correct incentives to local officials since local government only is 
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Chapter 3: Health System Reform In China: An Assessment of Recent 
Trends 
With Åke Blomqvist40 
 
Introduction 
Since the early 1980s, China's health care system has undergone dramatic changes. As 
the economy has grown and more resources have become available, the standards of 
medical care provided in some large hospitals in many Chinese cities are now similar to 
those in the world's high-income countries. Although the economy has been growing 
rapidly, health expenditures have grown even faster: Between 1980 and 2005, the fraction 
of China's GDP that was devoted to health care grew from about 3.2% to over 4.7%  
(See Appendix Table 1).But while the standards of care may have been rising on average, 
as more modern and advanced drugs and treatment methods have come into use, they 
have not done so for all population groups. For a large proportion of China's citizens, 
access to medical care may currently be worse than it was several decades ago. At the 
same time, those people who are able to get medical care when they are seriously ill now 
often have to pay large amounts out of their own pocket, and the fear of large medical 
bills is one reason often cited in the press for the Chinese population’s extraordinarily 
high savings rates. 
 
In this paper we first briefly review the changes that the Chinese health care system has 
undergone since the early 1980s when the period of centralized economic planning ended 
                                                            
40 This essay was first published in Singapore Economics Review(53) 5-26, 2008.  Some references are updated. 
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and the country began relying more on a decentralized market-based system. We then 
describe the major current health policy initiatives in urban and rural areas and discuss 
how they are likely to evolve over time. We also discuss whether, in the light of the 
experience with different institutional arrangements in other countries, the approaches 
taken in China are likely to strengthen the health care system in the sense of making it 
more cost-effective, and consistent with the desire of promoting a more equitable 
distribution of real income between rich and poor population groups.  
 
Our focus, both with respect to the efficiency and equity aspects of the reforms, is on the 
system that is evolving for funding health care, and providing wider access to modern 
health care and better protection (implicit or explicit) against the financial consequences 
of serious illness. Our conclusion from the analysis is that in order to predict how 
effectively China’s future health care system will perform in these respects, there is an 
urgent need for the state to clarify what role it is planning to play, as regulator, partial 
funder, and direct provider, in China's future health care system. We believe that the best 
strategy at present is to try to create mixed system with a significant role for the private 
sector both in the provision of health services and health insurance. Although 
international experience can be interpreted as being consistent with the idea that models 
centralized funding and management of health services production can function well in 
certain circumstance, our sense is that in China at present, a decentralized model with a 
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significant role for market-based competition among public and private service providers 
and insurance plans offers the best prospects.41 
 
The health care system in the centrally planned period 
After the 1950s and before 1980, the system of health care funding in China was such 
that almost everyone had access to at least a basic standard of care. In the countryside, 
most of the population belonged to an agricultural commune, and every member of a 
commune had access to basic primary care as well as (on referral) hospital care, at low 
out of pocket charges. In urban areas, workers and their dependants, as well as retirees, 
also had access to subsidized care through their employer (the government or a state-
owned enterprise (henceforth SOE)). As in rural areas, user charges were strictly 
controlled at low levels, and most of the funding of health service providers came either 
from the employers or as direct state subsidies; hospitals were either owned by the state 
or by large SOEs. In rural areas, primary-care providers were paid by the commune, and 
hospitals were funded by a mix of state and local subsidies and fee payments from the 
Cooperative Medical Schemes to which commune members belonged. 
                                                            
41 Additional statistics illustrating some characteristics of China’s health care system, and how they have changed over 
time, are provided in the Appendix. 
    A substantial English-language literature now exists on the recent history of China's health care system and health 
policy. A detailed account from the late 1990s is Economist Intelligence Unit (1998). A very readable short summary 
of recent developments is Blumenthal and Hsiao (2005). In year 2009, the Journal Health Economics as well as China 
Economic Review published special issues about recent debates about Chinese health reform. For rural health care, an 
exceptionally detailed account is in Asian Development Bank (2002); Liu Y. (2002) has a good description on the 
background and design of the basic urban plans that cover employees; additional detail is in Liu, G., Nolan, and Wen 
(2006). For an account of public perceptions regarding these plans see Wong, Tang, and Lo (2007). A very detailed and 
careful set of Chinese-language papers on recent history and policy proposals is Development Research Center (2005). 
While our paper draws heavily on this literature, we have brought it up to date (something that must be done frequently, 
given the pace of change in China at present), and tried to put the discussion of the Chinese reform process more 
explicitly into an international comparative framework than most of the existing literature does. 
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Changes since the 1980s: Decentralization, deregulation, and reduced subsidies 
As China began moving away from the earlier centrally planned system of economic 
management toward a market-based one in the 1980s, three kinds of measures were 
implemented that deeply affected the population's access to health care. First, the 
commune model of organizing agricultural production was replaced by the "Household 
Responsibility System" under which land is allocated to individual families and 
production and marketing decisions are decentralized to the family level. Second, many 
SOEs were privatized, reorganized, or even closed down. Third, responsibility for tax 
collection and funding of many kinds of government activity, including health care, was 
to a large extent decentralized from the state to local levels of government.42 
 
Reduced subsidies and higher patient charges 
As part of the fiscal decentralization process, state subsidies to hospitals were greatly 
reduced. While this was partially offset by increased subsidies from local governments, 
most hospitals nevertheless saw a large net decline in the government funding they 
received (especially in poorer regions where local government revenue was limited). To 
compensate, they were encouraged to find ways of generating more revenue from sources 
such as patient fees or markups on the drugs they provided. While the state continued to 
maintain control over the fees charged for common ("basic") services and standard drugs, 
hospitals had more freedom in setting their own charges for various kinds of non-basic 
procedures (often those involving diagnosis or treatment with advanced equipment), and 
                                                            
42 Here and in the rest of the paper we follow the convention of using “state” to refer to the central government, while 
“local government” refers to the provincial and lower levels. 
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newer drugs. With reduced government subsidies and increased hospital autonomy, it 
became common for hospitals to compensate their doctors through a system of bonuses 
that were tied to hospitals' net revenue which in turn depended partly on the amounts of 
money they were able to generate from patient charges and markups on the drug they 
prescribed and sold. Indirectly, therefore, many doctors had an incentive in treating, and 
collecting revenue from, a large number of patients, and to take into account the impact 
on the hospitals' revenue when making choices with respect to how to treat a patient with 
a given medical condition. This shift in incentives on physicians may be part of the 
reason for the increase in the acquisition and high utilization of certain types of advanced 
medical equipment for which hospitals could charge high patients fees, and for the 
increasing rate of prescriptions of new drugs on which hospitals could charge high mark-
ups. These new patterns of medical care and drug prescriptions partly explain the very 
large increases that took place in the average cost per treatment or hospitalization episode 
during the late 1980s and 1990s.43 
  
Collapse of the rural Cooperative Medical Schemes 
At the same time as new treatment and prescription patterns raised the cost of each illness 
episode, there was an increase in the share of health care costs that individuals had to pay 
out of pocket. Prior to the 1980s, the fees charged by township and county hospitals for 
treating patient from rural areas were to a large extent paid for collectively, either by the 
commune-sponsored Cooperative Medical Scheme to which all commune members 
                                                            
43 Data from Chinese Health Statistical Digest 2007 (Appendix Table 3) show that the average medical expense per 
inpatient episode rose from about 1700 to 3100 Yuan between 1995 and 2000, and to as much as 4700 Yuan in 2006. 
(There was little or no general price inflation over this period. 1 Singapore dollar is about 5 Yuan.) 
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belonged, and (for those with low income) from the village's collective welfare fund. 
Moreover, communes arranged and paid for most of the local primary care and 
pharmaceuticals that residents utilized. Since almost the entire rural population belonged 
to a local commune, this system came close to providing universal coverage, albeit for a 
relatively low level of care. 
 
In the early 1980s, however, the system of communes was disbanded as agricultural 
production was reorganized on the basis of the “Household Responsibility System". 
While local government took over some of the functions that the communes had had, the 
state tried to maintain a low level of taxation on farmers and placed restrictions on local 
officials' taxation powers. An important decision was to interpret compulsory 
membership fees in a Cooperative Medical Scheme (CMS) as a tax, so that these schemes 
could only continue if farmers were willing to enrol on a voluntary basis. In most cases 
they were not, and most CMS plans collapsed. At the low point in the 1990s, only some 
6.6% of the rural population belonged to a CMS; the remaining 87.3% were completely 
uninsured and had to pay the full cost of any medical care and drugs out of their own 







44 An extensive review of the situation in the rural-area health care sector is in Asian Development Bank (2002). 
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Table 1: Extent of Health Insurance Coverage (Percent of the respective populations) 
 Urban Rural 
 2003 1998 1993 2003 1998 1993 
BHIS 30.4 N/A N/A 1.5 N/A N/A 
GIS/LIS 8.6 38.9 66.41 0.3 1.7 3.41 




2.2 10.9 4.44 1.2 3.0 2.34 
Private 
insurance 
5.6 3.3 0.25 8.3 1.4 0.33 
No 
insurance 
44.8 44.1 27.28 79.0 87.3 84.11
Source: National Survey on Health Service in 1993, 1998, 2003, Ministry of Health 
(2004C, 2006B) 
 
Reduced insurance coverage in urban areas 
In the urban areas, too, the proportion of health care that patients had to pay out of pocket 
increased, as many workers and their dependents became uninsured. Under the earlier 
system, most urban residents were either insured under the Government Insurance 
Scheme (GIS) which covered government employees and their dependants, or under the 
Labour Insurance Scheme (LIS) which covered workers in SOEs and (with reduced  
benefits) their dependants. But through the 1990s, there was a substantial reduction in the 
proportion of residents covered by these plans. Part of the reason for this was the trend 
toward privatization and increased financial autonomy for SOEs.  SOEs scheduled for 
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privatization resisted taking over the responsibility of paying for the health care of 
current and (especially) retired workers and their dependants, and loss-making SOEs that 
could no longer count on having their deficits covered by the state sometimes chose to 
reduce their expenditures by no longer paying for the health care of these groups; some 
loss-making SOEs were even closed. As a result, the percentage of urban residents with 
health insurance coverage declined rapidly through the 1980s and especially in the 1990s. 
By 1998, it was estimated that as many as 44% of urban residents were without health 
insurance (see the row labelled "no insurance" in Table 1). This statistic probably 
understates the problem, as it most likely is based on the number of registered urban 
residents. But after 1980, China also has seen an increasing inflow of migrant workers 
from the countryside to the cities. These workers typically were not covered by the LIS 
under which SOE employees were covered, and may not be completely accounted for in 
the population base used in the estimate of the uninsured share of the population. 
 
Policy Initiatives Since the late 1990s 
From the mid-1990s, the problems in China's health care sector have attracted increasing 
attention among policy makers at both the central and local levels, and there has been a 
lively debate about various approaches to health care reform since that time. A number of 
pilot projects in both urban and rural areas have been conducted and evaluated, some 
with partial funding from international agencies such as the World Bank, the U.K. 
Department for International Development, the World Health Organization, and others. 
In urban areas, considerable progress has been made in implementing the Basic Health 
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Insurance Scheme of employment-related insurance that was introduced in late 1998, 
while in rural areas a decision has been made to provide a considerable amount of 
financial support from both the state and local levels to help revive the CMS plans. In the 
next main sections we look at these initiatives in more detail. 
 
Reforming urban health care: The Basic Health Insurance Scheme 
 
The basic model 
Following lengthy pilot projects in the cities of Zhenjiang and Jiujiang from 1994, the 
State Council in December 1998 announced a “land-mark decree” (Wong, et al. 2006) 
concerning the establishment of the Basic Health Insurance System for Uban Staff and 
Workers. The system (henceforth referred to as BHIS) was based on the following simple 
principles.45 First, risk-pooling and plan management is through a Social Insurance 
Bureau in each large Chinese city. The basic version of the plan covers only current and 
retired employees (but not their dependants) of participating employers, who can be 
either government, SOEs, or private firms. The intention is that the BHIS plan will 
gradually replace the GIS and LIS plans and be compulsory, but this goal has so far only 
been partially met.  
 
                                                            
45 The following account draws heavily on Liu Y. (2002). 
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Funding of the plan is through pay-roll deductions which, at a minimum, have to be at the 
level of 8% of the worker's salary (6% from the employer and 2% from the employee). 
This amount is then split between an "individual account" which belongs to the worker, 
and which can be used to pay for both outpatient and inpatient care, and a "social pooling 
account". In the early version of the plan, the split was 3.8% to the individual account, 
4.2% to the social pooling account. In case the individual has an illness episode requiring 
inpatient care, he or she can get reimbursement from the social pooling account for 
expenses in excess of a deductible (in the basic plan, equivalent to 10% of the worker's 
wage), subject to a locally determined co-insurance rate, and subject also to an upper 
limit equivalent to 6 times the average annual wage in the city. There were two additional 
important provisions. First, coverage included only drugs and procedures on an explicit 
list of Essential Drugs and Essential Services; drugs and services not on the list were not 
covered. (The relevant legislation provided for some, but not unlimited, discretion for 
local authorities to decide what items would be included on the list.) Second, 
reimbursement could only be made for services received from hospitals and clinics that 
had been approved by the city's Social Insurance Bureau. 
 
By and large, the BHIS model was considered a promising approach by many at the time 
it was introduced. The individual-account feature was often thought to have been 
modelled on the Singapore system of Medical Savings Accounts, and appealed to those 
who believe that an effective system of cost control in health care should give a 
prominent role to demand-side incentives. At the same time, the fact that reimbursement 
out of the risk-pooling account could only be made for services rendered by providers 
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who had been approved by the Social Insurance Bureau that managed each plan was 
reminiscent of the principle underlying Preferred Provider Organizations in the health 
care system in the U.S. and elsewhere. Since the basis for reimbursement was subject to 
negotiation between the plan and providers, there was reason to believe that the kind of 
payment methods that have become common in managed-care plans in the U.S., or in the 
publicly-funded systems in countries like the U.K. and Sweden, could come into more 
widespread use in the Chinese cities with BHIS plans.46 
 
Although BHIS was a carefully constructed and internally consistent blueprint for urban 
health insurance reform, it left a number of questions unanswered, in part because it was 
intended to allow for a substantial degree of local variation in the final plan design. In the 
time that has passed since its introduction, a clearer picture has emerged regarding how 
the reform process may proceed further in various dimensions. 
 
BHIS plans in practice:  Coverage and cost 
While the initial model specified a payroll levy of a minimum of 8% (6% from the 
employer, 2% from the employee) for membership, in many cities the contribution rate 
has ended up being higher. One study (DRC 2005) cites an average of around 10%, and 
in Shanghai the combined contribution rate was as high as 12% (Liu, Nolan and Wen 
2004, p. 8). Several cities also provide for supplemental insurance for coverage of 
                                                            
46 Yip and Eggleston (2004) is an interesting account of an example where reimbursement methods of this type were 
tried. Blomqvist (2002) reviews the arguments in favour of the view that these methods are more likely than fee for 
service to promote cost-effective treatment decisions in any health care system. 
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expenditures in excess of the upper limit in the main plan, which may add as much as 2% 
of the employees' salary to the cost. 
 
In addition to the demand side cost sharing in the form of a deductible, co-insurance, and 
an upper limit, the extent of coverage in the BHIS has also been limited to a significant 
extent by the fact that in order for patients to be able to claim reimbursement, the services 
and drugs that they have paid for must appear on the lists of Essential Drugs and 
Essential Services referred to above. The fact that hospital patients may be asked to 
undergo procedures or use drugs that are not on the list (in part because the hospitals have 
an incentive to recommend such procedures or drugs, since their prices are not controlled) 
effectively reduces the extent to which the insurance protects them against financial 
hardship. To deal with this problem would require either making the lists more inclusive 
(which would further raise costs), and/or changing the incentives on providers (hospitals) 
so that they no longer have an incentive to recommend them except in urgent cases. In 
many cases, the BHIS plans have already altered incentives on providers by paying them 
through prospective methods (such as global budgets). Placing restrictions on the extent 
to which providers could provide additional kinds of services to the insured patients 
would take them further in the direction of becoming, in effect, a type of managed care 
plan.  
 
While the intention at present is that all regular urban employees will ultimately be 
covered under the BHIS, firms and government departments were given some leeway 
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with respect to when to sign up. While the number of enrollees has been increasing 
rapidly, it still falls far short of 100% of eligible employees in some cities. According to 
the most recent statistics we could find (Xinhua News Agency 2010a), BHIS covered 219 
million people in total at the end of 2009. The total number of urban employees at the end 
of 2008 was around 302 million, while retirees numbered somewhat about 60 million. 
Thus BHIS enrollment was about 70% of the number eligible, and about half of the total 
urban population.47 Nevertheless, the system appears to be firmly established, and one 
can expect that most employees and retired workers will ultimately be enrolled. 
 
Toward universal coverage? 
In the long run, a more critical issue will be what approaches will be taken in order to 
extend coverage to groups that are not eligible under the current plan: dependants, the 
self-employed, retirees not covered as a result of past employment, migrant workers on 
short-term contracts, etc. In several other countries that have used the same kind of social 
insurance model as the BHIS (Germany, Japan), the systems were gradually extended to 
cover additional population groups in the same kind of plans as the original employment-
based one. That is, the benefits to which patients were entitled, and the rates and methods 
of provider reimbursement were the same. Thus even though the funding of the insurance 
system was through several separate plans for different population groups, the total 
revenue from all of them was effectively pooled into a single fund through which 
providers were paid. Although the basic principle was that the payments into each plan 
                                                            
47 Note, however, that some urban residents still are covered by GIS/LIS, and some have private commercial health 
insurance. 
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were to be sufficient to pay for the health care services used by its members, some plans 
were subsidized by the government, and there was also a degree of cross-subsidization so 
that surpluses in plans with relatively healthy members were used to offset deficits in the 
plans covering more costly groups (such as the elderly).48 
 
In some cities in China, measures to extend coverage to other population groups than 
employees have been undertaken. For example, in the city of Xiamen, persons who are 
self-employed or temporarily unemployed can join the BHIS on a voluntary basis by 
paying a premium linked to the average annual wage in the city. In addition, the city 
government subsidizes an even more basic voluntary plan (with higher co-insurance rates 
than the BHIS plan) for particular categories of individuals (the elderly, the disabled, 
people who receive low-income support). Similar plans exist or are planned in other cities 
as well, for example in Jiangsu province (Xinhua News Agency 2007D, Ren, et al. 2007). 
The latter source provides some degree of detail concerning the plan that exists in Jilin 
province, where the “residents’ plan” is described as having a benefit level somewhere 
between that of the BHIS and rural CMS plans (in terms of co-insurance rates, 
deductibles, and benefit ceilings, etc.). The ceilings for different versions of the plan 
range from 35000 to 45000 Yuan, with annual premiums of 120-200 Yuan. Officials 
interviewed for the article estimated that even when benefits did not hit the ceiling, they 
                                                            
48 A good description of the universal health insurance system in Japan is in Campbell and Ikegami (1998); Imai (2002) 
provides updated detail. An account of the German system can be found in the series on Health Systems in Transition 
published by the European Observatory on Health Systems and Policies (2004). Although the German population has 
(almost) universal coverage, not everyone belongs to the sickness fund system, since individuals with a high enough 
income are allowed to opt out of that system and get private coverage instead. 
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typically covered no more than 60% or less of individuals’ actual expenditures because 
many drugs and services they had to pay for were not on the plan’s approved lists.  
 
Expanding coverage through separate plans for different population groups obviously 
represents desirable progress compared to the status quo. In the long run, an additional 
objective could be to move toward a system in which there would be a single public plan 
for which everyone would be eligible. There are a number of advantages with such a 
system. First, a single publicly managed plan would obviously be simpler and hence less 
expensive to administer. Second, to the extent that there are several publicly managed 
plans which are subsidized by the government, the question how much support each plan 
will receive becomes a difficult one. Conversely, having a single public plan to which all 
citizens have access on equal terms can be an effective way of redistributing real income 
to individuals who are at high risk of illness (Blomqvist and Horn, 1984). In spite of these 
advantages of a uniform public plan, however, it must be recognized that this is an 
objective that can only be reached in the long run. In particular, it is not realistic at this 
time to propose a single publicly managed health insurance plan that would cover both 
urban and rural residents on the same terms, or that would give similar coverage to 
people in all parts of China.49  
                                                            
49 In the context of the current BHIS plans, arguments in favour of a uniform publicly managed plan applies mainly to 
the part that flows through the Social Pooling Account. Since the individual accounts (which are a form of Medical 
Savings Accounts familiar from other countries) do not involve any risk pooling, they are a less important as a tool to 
protect individuals from financial hardship in case of illness. In Singapore, MSAs also serve the function of making 
workers accumulate funds to be used to pay for health care when they become old. Although doing so is an important 
objective, it can also be accomplished through the part of social insurance that is designed to give individuals an 
adequate retirement income. 
                                                                                              134 
 
Further moves in the direction of universal coverage in the urban plan were initiated.  For 
urban residents that are not eligible for the employment-based urban plan, city 
governments now offer an “urban residents’ plan”. Central and local governments will 
contribute 120 Yuan annually per person insured in year 2010, and the premium payable 
by the insured will be around 2% of the average disposable income in each city. This 
resident insurance scheme is voluntary (Xinhua News Agency 2010b). 
 
Payment methods, "opting out" and competition among insurers 
One of the lessons that can be drawn from the experiences in the U.S. and other countries 
with mixed public-private systems of insurance and health services provision is that in 
the absence of regulation of fees and treatment patterns, health care costs may end up 
growing at an unsustainable rate. In particular, this is likely to happen if providers are 
paid on the basis of fee for service and insurance is of the conventional "passive" kind 
under which the insurers simply pay the bills submitted by providers on a retrospective 
basis. Attempts to control costs through demand side incentives on patients in this kind of 
environment tend to be of limited effectiveness, as individual patients typically do not 
have the information or opportunity to make meaningful comparisons regarding the cost-
effectiveness of competing treatment packages, at least not in cases of serious illness.  
 
In China, the response to this problem has taken the form of, on the one hand, a system of 
strict regulation of the fees and prices of a set of basic health care services and drugs, and, 
on the other hand, the use of payment methods other than fee for service (such as 
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prospective global budgets) for hospital services covered under BHIS. However, as 
discussed above, certain kinds of procedures and drugs have been exempted from price 
and fee regulation. Moreover, the prospective reimbursement system under the urban 
plan has excluded certain services and drugs that hospitals have provided and prescribed; 
these exclusions can be regarded as a crude form of demand-side incentives. Together, 
these features of the system are likely to have been an important part of the explanation 
why health care costs have risen so fast in China, and why many people have suffered 
catastrophic consequences as a result of illness. 
 
Further progress in the task of bringing costs under control and improving the degree of 
insurance protection for the urban population can be made by continued expansion and 
reform of the BHIS system along the lines discussed above. However, the objectives of 
cost control and improved insurance protection are to some extent contradictory, and 
striking the right balance will raise many difficult and controversial issues.50 An approach 
that may make the task more manageable is to allow part of the population's insurance 
protection to be supplied through the private sector. This can be done in a number of 
ways. In the terminology of OECD (Colombo and Tapay 2004), private and public health 
insurance can coexist, with private insurance being either supplementary (covering 
services not paid for under the public scheme) or complementary (paying all or part of 
the patient's share of the cost under the public plan's deductible and co-insurance 
provisions). Either of these models would be possible in the context of the BHIS plan. 
                                                            
50 The classic example of this contradiction is the tradeoff between the efficiency losses associated with “moral hazard” 
and the gains from more complete insurance protection when setting the patient co-payment rate in a conventional 
insurance plan. However, it is relevant also for the choice between insurance through conventional plans or managed-
care plans. These issues are discussed in any textbook in health economics, e.g., Folland, Goodman, and Stano (2007).  
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However, the model we believe should be even more seriously considered is the one 
where private insurance acts as a substitute for the public (BHIS) plan. Under this model, 
insurance for employed workers would still be compulsory, but firms that choose an 
approved private insurance plan for their employees would receive a rebate of all or part 
of the contribution they would otherwise have to pay to the BHIS plan.  
 
Under a mixed insurance system of this kind, it is likely that private insurance would be 
attractive to firms with relatively well-paid workers who would be willing to pay for 
more extensive insurance coverage than that offered under the BHIS plan. However, 
opening up the insurance market to competition between the BHIS and private plans 
might also cause private firms to offer plans with coverage similar to that of the BHIS 
plan if they were able to negotiate with providers for less costly packages of health 
services than those supplied under the BHIS plan. (They could do this using techniques 
similar to those employed by managed-care plans in the U.S. and elsewhere.)51 
Alternatively, they may be able to negotiate more attractive patterns of coverage at the 
same cost, for example, by providing some degree of coverage for items not on the list of 
Essential Services and Essential Drugs but raising deductibles, for example. One 
advantage of an arrangement that allows competition of this kind is that it might 
encourage managers of the BHIS plan to imitate successful innovations in contracting 
and paying for health services developed by private plans. 
 
                                                            
51 For large firms, an attractive alternative might be to offer a high degree of self-insurance, for example, by offering 
their employees certain kinds of treatment in their own clinics or hospitals. 
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Opting out, adverse selection, and equity 
A possible objection against allowing competition among insurers is that private 
insurance will follow a strategy of developing plans that are especially attractive to firms 
with relatively healthy employees (for example, because the firms employ mostly young 
workers). If this happens, average health care spending in the public plan will rise as 
those with low average utilization leave the public plan in favour of a private one. Indeed, 
a tendency of this kind was evident in the early days of BHIS when the firms that signed 
up disproportionately consisted of ones with an older workforce and, therefore, high 
expected health care costs. 
 
Although allowing individuals and firms to substitute private coverage in place of the 
public plan may give rise to a selection process of this kind, the significance of the 
problem should not be exaggerated. First, it can be overcome, at least partially, by a 
system of graduated rebates to those firms that sign up with private plans. For example, 
firms with a relatively young workforce might still be required to continue paying part of 
their contribution to the BHIS even if their workers are covered by substitute private 
insurance. Second, to the extent that those who remain in the public BHIS plan are firms 
with employees whose expected health care costs are above average (for example, 
because they are relatively old), it is reasonable that the cost of their health care should be 
partially subsidized out of public funds. Indeed, one may argue that individuals whose 
expected health care costs are above average (through no fault of their own) deserve 
some degree of public subsidy for the same reason that society supports individuals 
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whose real income is low because of other factors (such as disability). Thus if the BHIS 
plan ends up being the "default plan" that insures a population of individuals with 
relatively high risk of illness, it is reasonable to expect that it will be paid a state subsidy 
on equity grounds. 
 
Reconstructing the Rural Health Care System 
As in the case of health care reform in urban areas, one element of the government's 
strategy for reorganizing the system of funding and producing health care in rural areas 
has been to emphasize the importance of  a funding mechanism that will entail at least 
some degree of insurance protection for most individuals. The most important way in 
which this has been done is through a nationwide program under which state subsidizes 
individual subscriptions of rural residents to CMS plans.52 Specifically, for every resident 
who pays the stipulated premium of 10 yuan per year, the state and local governments 
contribute at least 20 yuan each to the plan. That is, the total contribution per person is 50 
yuan per year (equivalent to about 10 Singapore dollars), of which the individual pays 
only one fifth. Following strong encouragement from the central government to rural 
officials, enrollment has expanded very rapidly in the last few years. Even though Table 1 
showed an enrollment percentage of less than 10% of the rural population as late as 2003, 
a recent news (Xinhua News Agency 2010c) reports a total enrollment of 835 million 
persons, accounting for over 95% of China's rural population. 
                                                            
52 The basic framework for current state policy toward rural health care was outlined in a major joint announcement by 
the State Council and the Central Party Committee on the occasion of the China National Rural Health Conference in 
October 2002 (see Liu and Rao, 2006). 
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Improvement in the degree of insurance protection for the rural population is only one of 
the priorities for rural health care reform, however. There is also widespread recognition 
that there are certain aspects of the service delivery system that need to be improved. The 
issues here are partly related to problems specific to the delivery of health care in rural as 
opposed to urban areas. 
 
Problems in delivering rural health services 
First, partly because the rural population is so dispersed, the task of maintaining high 
standards of public health so as to limit the spread of contagious disease may be more 
challenging in rural areas. Similarly, reaching high standards of maternal and child health 
care is likely to demand more resources in the countryside than in cities where no one 
lives far from modern health facilities. Second, in rural areas the question of functional 
differentiation among hospitals is more important than in an urban setting. Specifically, 
while economies of scale might cause one to favour concentration of most hospital 
resources in a relatively small number of large hospitals in urban areas, such a pattern is 
less likely to be efficient in the countryside since it will entail long and costly trips (or 
delays in treatment) for patients who need hospitalization.  
 
The pattern of hospital services production during the pre-1980 period reflected this, in 
the sense that a large number of small township hospitals with relatively basic facilities 
co-existed with a small number of large county hospitals with more advanced equipment. 
The extent of utilization of these different hospital types was governed by a clearly 
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defined system of referrals under which treatment in a township hospital was only 
allowed on referral from the village doctor while treatment in a county hospital required a 
referral from the township. This system appears to have functioned quite well in the sense 
that patients were treated in the least costly facility appropriate to the seriousness of their 
condition. 
 
Similarly, under the pre-1980 system of collective financing of rural health care, there 
existed a well-functioning system for providing public-health services such as 
immunization and maternal and child health care, in conjunction with basic primary care 
(curative services and drugs); the personnel providing these services were salaried 
employees of either the communes or the government. As the extent of collective 
financing declined following the abolition of the commune system, basic curative care 
and drugs often continued to be supplied by doctors or lower-level health professionals 
on the basis of private payment by patients. However, many kinds of public-health 
services cannot profitably be supplied on that basis, and it is widely thought that, as a 
result, the standards of public health in rural areas have declined. Addressing this 
problem will therefore be an important task in the reconstruction of the rural system. 
 
Following the shift to less collective financing, there has also been a major change in the 
way the rural hospital system has functioned. In particular, the role of township hospitals 
has declined substantially, and while the hospitals still operate, statistics suggest that they 
are not heavily utilized (see Appendix Table 5). In part, this is the result of a vicious 
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circle under which the increasing profitability of supplying high-level services with 
advanced equipment has caused many of the good doctors who previously worked in 
township hospitals to seek employment in better-equipped county hospitals. As patients 
have observed this, they have become distrustful of the quality of care offered in 
township hospitals and frequently chosen to go directly to the county hospitals. This has 
made it even less profitable for good doctors to stay in the township hospitals, 
accelerating the process. Breaking out of this vicious circle and making better use of 
township hospitals is now widely recognized as an important objective for rural health 
care reform. 
 
Models of rural health care reform 
The recent decisions to increase the amount of state and local support for a revival of 
CMS plans and to encourage local communities to sign up members suggest that the 
model will be an important part of China's rural health care system in future years. Other 
aspects of the rural health care system, including the questions how the CMS funds and 
the service delivery systems will be managed and what the future role of township 
hospitals will be, are still somewhat unsettled. However, valuable lessons are being 
learned both from the experiences with different approaches taken by local governments 
in various parts of China as they respond to the central government’s encouragement and 
financial incentives, and through a number of pilot projects, completed or ongoing, that 
are being conducted with support from international agencies such as the World Bank, 
the WHO, the U.K. Department for International Development, and others. (Appendix 
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Tables A6 and A7 gives examples of the kinds of features that are tried in various 
models.) 
 
There is considerable variability in the way CMS plans are designed in different parts of 
China. Since 2002, most of them are designed and managed by county governments, 
subject to broad principles set by the state. In some respects they function in the same 
way as the urban BHIS plans. In some cases, what is covered under the CMS plans is 
limited to the same services and drugs as those covered in the BHIS plans (see, for 
example, the website of Wujin district government (2003)), and some of them also divide 
their funds into the equivalent of individual accounts and a county-wide social pooling 
account. Coverage typically includes not only part of the cost of inpatient hospital care 
but also outpatient services at the village level and above. However, because the 
resources of the plans are limited, the degree of coverage is typically reduced by 
deductibles in some cases, and substantial co-insurance rates (sometimes well in excess 
of 50%), as well as by relatively low ceilings that limit what the plan will pay out per 
year or illness episode. Generally, therefore, they offer considerably less complete 
insurance protection than the BHIS plans.  
 
Most rural health care at the village level is provided by private practitioners (doctors or 
other health professionals) who are paid on the basis of fee for service and augment their 
income by the markups they earn from selling pharmaceuticals. Inpatient care is also 
supplied on the basis of fee for service, either at controlled prices (for basic services) or 
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at unregulated charges set by the hospitals. In recognition of the fact that the practice 
patterns (and fees) that emerge in such a system may not be cost-effective, some of the 
pilot projects in rural areas include various features intended to improve the way 
treatment decisions are made. Several of them have organized bulk purchasing of drugs 
and include attempts to get primary care providers to follow standardized treatment 
protocols and prescription patterns. They may also devote resources to personnel training, 
especially at the village and township levels. 
 
Another feature of some of the pilot projects is that they are trying to reinstate the system 
requiring a referral from a village or township level provider before an individual will 
receive care in a township or county level (or higher). In at least one case (Hsiao 2004), 
the pilot project features payment of village-based primary care providers on the basis of 
salary and a bonus (rather than fee for service), under an arrangement with the CMS plan, 
and the plan also negotiates terms for care delivered to its members in township and 
county hospitals. That is, the CMS in this project functions somewhat like an HMO or a 
managed-care plan which not only helps pay for its members' health care but also gets 
involved in negotiating with providers at different levels regarding the terms on which 
the care is delivered. 
In contrast to most of the regular county-wide CMS plans, the pilot projects have 
typically been undertaken and managed at the township level. (Traditionally, many 
regular CMS plans were also organized and managed at the township level.) If the 
intention is to gradually move toward a CMS-based system that incorporates some of the 
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lessons drawn from the pilot projects, an important question is whether the plans will be 
managed at the township or county levels. Because of the importance of local knowledge 
and a close working relationship between plan managers and village-based providers, 
decentralized management with substantial financial and organizational responsibility at 
the township level may seem a promising approach to creating a system that can contain 
costs in a way that is efficient and focus on the health problems that are most significant 
in the respective localities.53 Township-level management may also improve the 
likelihood that a multi-level referral system will work well. In the project being organized 
in collaboration with a team from Harvard University described in Hsiao (2004), 
substantial management responsibilities have even been given to elected committees at 
the village level, who supervise the primary care and public-health services delivered in 
the village, and appoint representatives to the board that manages the plan at the township 
level. The board’s responsibilities, in turn, include contracting for services from health 
centres and higher-level hospitals.  
 
While it is easy to list advantages of decentralized management one must also take into 
account the argument that village and township administrative unit are too small to 
accomplish adequate risk pooling. However, this argument loses much of its force once it 
is recognized that the functions of risk-pooling and plan management can be separated 
through some form of re-insurance (under which the risks of local plans are further 
pooled at a higher level). For example, if the plans are managed by township health 
                                                            
53 Models where publicly funded systems of health insurance and service delivery have delegated substantial 
administrative responsibilities to low-level administrative units include the experiments with fund-holding GPs (and its 
successor, “practice-based commissioning”) in the U.K., and with primary-care centered management in certain 
counties in Sweden in the 1990s (Blomqvist 2001, 2002). 
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centres, county governments can offer a degree of risk pooling across township plans, 
allowing deficits in some plans to be offset by surpluses in others.54 
 
Implementing rural health reform: A role for the private sector? 
As evidence accumulates from pilot projects, and from other countries, regarding what is 
a good model for rural health care reform, the question arises how a blueprint for reform 
in China would be implemented. We expect that such a blueprint would involve use of 
tools such as treatment protocols, drug formularies, and a referral system. It will also 
make use of methods such as bulk purchasing of drugs, and payments mechanisms and 
pricing of health services that are different from conventional fee for service. 
 
An important issue will be whether the system that ultimately emerges will be entirely 
managed by government employees, or whether there will be a role for the private sector.  
The organization and management of a rural health care system with these kinds of 
features will be a complex task, and will require development of a large body of skilled 
managers, especially if the system is to be managed in a decentralized fashion, for 
example, at the township level. Although it may be possible for township and county 
governments to acquire the relevant expertise by training existing staff or hire new staff 
with the required skills, it is also possible that some or all of the management functions 
                                                            
54  For an eloquent and convincing discussion of the effectiveness of local management in the context of using common 
property resources in rural areas, see Ostrom (1990). Although the underlying economic problems are somewhat 
different, a cooperative rural insurance system also involves certain issues that require collective action and some 
degree of monitoring (such as support for community members who are at high risk of illness, and monitoring of both 
local service providers, and plan members’ use of the system). 
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could be provided by the private sector under contracts with local boards or governments. 
Privately contracted managers could then be assisted by specialized firms providing 
services such as updating of treatment protocols and drug formularies, as well as 
supplying drugs under bulk purchasing arrangements. They could also develop model 
contracts between CMS plan managers and service providers, both those supplying 
primary care at the village level, and for hospital care at the tertiary level. 
Experimentation with a model of private management is currently going on in five 
counties in Fujian Province (Lin 2007). It is noted in this article that enrollees may see 
private management as an advantage to the extent they want to reduce the influence of 
outside officials in the system. A similar point is made in Hsiao’s (2004) description of 
management by locally elected committees. 
 
Reasserting the role of the state in Chinese health care 
One of the most important trends that has changed China's health care system since the 
1980s has been the reduction in the share of health care costs that has been paid by the 
state. This trend has resulted to a large extent from the decreased subsidies that 
government-owned hospitals have received. Some Chinese policy-makers, especially at 
the central level, are now arguing that the reduction in the role of the state (that is, the 
central government) has gone too far, and that the problems that have arisen in the health 
care sector in the last 20 years can best be resolved through measures that would entail 
increasing the state's role and financial commitment to the sector beyond current levels.  
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Specifically, a 2005 report put out by a group of experts working at the Development 
Research Center of the State Council expresses strong doubts regarding the effectiveness 
of current reform approaches, and its concluding chapter includes a recommendation that 
the state (central government) should fund and operate a network of township health 
centres and urban community hospital clinics that will provide basic medical care at low 
charges for a range of “common and frequently occurring diseases” (DRC 2005).55  There 
is evidence that these proposals are being taken seriously: In Premier Wen Jiabao’s 
speech to the Fifth Session of the Tenth National People’s Congress of March 5, 2007, he 
referred to large allocations from the central government budget for the purpose of 
ultimately setting up a government health clinic in every town and township, as well as 
funding to support the establishment of new urban community facilities that will deliver 
primary care in cities in China’s western and central regions (Xinhua News Agency 
2007E). 
 
The DRC report's account of the problems that China's health care system has 
experienced is carefully documented and convincing in many respects. However, the 
report may perhaps be considered too pessimistic regarding the prospects that current 
approaches to urban and rural health reform will prove effective. Moreover, the proposals 
in the DRC report are not, in principle, incompatible with current approaches. A universal 
network of community hospitals in urban areas would obviously improve the access to 
                                                            
55 A Chinese-language version of this report can be viewed at Ge, et al (2007). Another interesting critique of the 
current model for urban health insurance reform in China is in Dong (2006), in which the author argues that the attempt 
to emulate the successful Singaporean approach to cost containment in health care did not work well because of the 
different socio-economic characteristics of the two countries. It may be worth noting as well that one reason the 
government-sponsored plans can take a relatively limited role in paying for health care in Singapore is that employer 
benefits and private insurance pays for a substantial portion of the health care costs in that country, as much as 40% in 
the early 2000s (Dong, 2006, p. 211). These funding sources only play a minor role in the Chinese system today. 
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basic health care for that 50% or so of the urban population that currently has no 
insurance, including migrant workers. Even if these clinics were to offer services to 
everyone, persons with higher income or BHIS insurance coverage might nevertheless 
prefer to get their primary-care services from other hospitals and clinics, especially if 
waiting times for treatment were to become long in the government clinics. If basic 
services were to be offered at highly subsidized rates through such a network of publicly 
funded clinics, the case for maintaining regulations forcing every provider to supply these 
services at the same low rates would be much less strong. If hospitals and private 
providers were allowed to charge higher rates for such services, doctors in these 
institutions would be under less pressure to induce patients to use advanced diagnostic 
and treatment services, and newer drugs (the charges for which are not regulated). 
Moreover, if the publicly funded clinics were to be financed at a level where they did not 
have to rely on patient charges to pay their doctors' salaries, they would also have less of 
an incentive to recommend such treatment patterns.  
 
In rural areas, a system of subsidized health centres might also be given a mandate to 
carry out many of the public health functions (such as vaccinations and treatment and 
control of various kinds of contagious disease) that have been languishing due to lack of 
resources and incentives in recent years. In addition, if the health centers provided basic 
primary-care services at low cost, CMS funds could be used to a greater extent to pay for 
inpatient hospital care with lower deductibles and co-insurance rates than in present CMS 
plans. Again, therefore, a network of state-funded and centrally managed health centres 
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could serve a useful function within the context of continuing to pursue the current CMS-
based approaches to rural health care reform.56 
 
Conclusion 
There is little doubt that health system reform will remain a central item in the Chinese 
debate over economic and social policy for some time to come. As has often been noted 
in speeches by Chinese leaders in recent years, the objective of reducing the degree of 
inequality in the way the fruits of economic growth are being distributed is a policy 
priority. Organizing a health care system that guarantees access to good health care for 
the entire population, poor as well as rich, is an effective (albeit indirect) way of doing so.  
In accordance with the principle of "crossing the river by feeling the stones", some of the 
basic principles of nationwide reforms are being established through "field-testing" in 
pilot projects. This was the case for the system of BHIS plans, the cornerstone of urban 
health system reform, and the strategy is also being used to design good models for rural 
health care reform. It seems reasonable to expect that current pilot projects in rural areas 
will result in somewhat more concrete policy directions in the future. At the same time, 
experimentation with different methods for widening the degree of coverage for the urban 
population could also yield helpful results. 
                                                            
56 Although the DRC report has received considerable attention and appears to have influenced the thinking of 
decision-makers, it is clear that the more general debate about the role of the state in funding and producing health 
services is far from finished. At the time this paper was being finalized, a report appeared on the different proposals for 
health care reform that have been submitted by seven groups that were asked to make submissions to an inter-
ministerial working group on this topic that was set up in late 2006 (Southern Weekend, Guangzhou, June 7, 2007, in 
Chinese). The groups were drawn from Peking, Fudan, and Beijing Normal Universities, the DRC, the WHO, the 
World Bank, and the McKinsey business consulting firm. While few details are provided, the article suggests that the 
views expressed diverged widely.  
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An important dimension of the reform process is what role will be played by the state, as 
regulator, partial funder, and direct service provider, and to what extent competition and 
markets involving private service providers and insurers will be used as a mechanism to 
produce a better system. Our conclusion in this regard is that there clearly is a set of 
important functions for which the state must take responsibility, but also that the health 
care system is likely to function better at the present stage of China's development if 
some degree of competition among private and public insurers is allowed. 
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Appendix for Chapter 1: 
Lemma 2: We have following market equilibrium conditions:  
)(' ccgcgcg Ttxp  .         (1.3) 
)(' ccbcbcb Ttxp  .         (1.4) 
)(' cd Tdp  .          (1.5)  
uTTT ccc  )()('  .         (1.6)  
 
Proof:  Since there may be some physicians who only treat serious cases, case mix in a clinic may 
be not equal to v. Let us set r  as the proportion of mild cases in a clinic, where 10  r . For 
physicians who specialized in serious case, r=0.  
We have the first order condition on (1) with respect to cT , 
0)1))(('())('(  rTtxprTtxp ccbcbcbccgcgcg      (A1) 
It is easy to see that the above equation is a weighted summation of (1.3) and (1.4). 
cbcg prrp )1(   is the expected price for a patient before seeing a doctor. 
 
Suppose the equilibrium price for mild cases is larger than price in (1.3) (i.e., )(' ccgcg Ttx  ).  A 
physician can extract profit for treating a mild case. This cannot be an equilibrium since a 
physician can deviate to reduce price for mild cases by a very small number ,  where 0 , and 
increase the price for serious case to maintain a same expected price for patients. In this case, 
since all patients, who are diagnosed by physicians specializing in treating serious case, already 
know they are mild cases, these patients will prefer to be treated in this deviating clinic with 
lower fee for mild cases. Deviating physician will have extra profits from these patients. Hence, 
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every other physician will follow this deviating strategy until (1.3) is fulfilled. 
 
Suppose the equilibrium price for the mild case is less than the price in (1.3). Therefore, a 
physician cannot cover marginal cost when treating a mild case. A deviating physician can 
increase the fee for mild cases and decrease the price for serious cases.  All cases referred from 
physicians specializing in serious cases will choose other providers and deviating providers will 
make profit. Hence, every other physician will follow this deviating strategy until (1.3) is fulfilled. 
Since (1.3) is equilibrium price for mild cases, from (A1), (1.4) is the equilibrium price for 
serious cases. 
 
Substituting (1.3), (1.4) and (1.5) into physician’s utility function, we have condition (1.6). This 
is because the physician market is perfectly competitive. Every physician will get the reservation 
utility. 
 
Since )( cT  is a strictly convex function of cT , we have 0)()('  ccc TTT  . Differentiating 
right-hand-side of (1.6) with cT , we have 0)('' cc TT  . Differentiating left-hand-side, we get 
zero. Left-hand-side is monotonically increasing in cT . Only a unique cT  can satisfy (1.6).  
Hence, every clinic physician’s working hours is cT .  
 
The equilibrium is not unique. The reason is that the number of clinic physicians who only treat 
serious cases cannot be determined.  This can be seen from following equation: 
dNvNtNtvnnT cgcbccbc  )1()(       (A2) 
cbn  denotes the number of physicians who specialize in treating serious cases. The left-hand-side 
is the total working hours for all clinic physicians. The right-hand-side is total time input for all 
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patients seeking treatment in clinics. The right-hand-side is always equal to the left-hand- side. 
Hence, the total number of private clinics ccb nn   is determined by (A2). However, the number 
of clinics for each type (i.e., cbn  or cn ) is not determined. Q.E.D.  
 
3.4: Comparative statics 
In this section, we look at how the planner’s policies changes with parameters. We have 
























  and 0

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Implications from these results are straightforward. Larger capacity in the hospital implies that 
there are more hospital physicians and less private physicians in the local market. With a higher 
level of reservation utility, local planner will substitute time input by non-physician input (i.e., 
less working hours per case) and hire fewer hospital physicians. Change of switching cost has no 
effect here since behavior of patients and planner will not be affected by changes in switching 
cost. With superior technology in utilization of capital inputs, hospital physicians’ time input per 
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case will be less. For each physician, he can treat more patients, given total working hours. Hence, 
fewer physicians will work in the hospital. 
 
Proposition 1: A  ‘specialization’ equilibrium will hold when 










.   
Proof: The proof of Proposition 1 is straightforward. If it is profitable to deviate to be a GP 
physician (i.e., utility is not less than the reservation utility), 
udNNvNpNvp cgcgcgcgdcgcgcg mtmmmx   )()(   . A ‘pure fraud’ equilibrium will 
break down. An equilibrium with specialized GPs emerges. Q.E.D. 
 
Corollary 1: With the same set of parameter values, either ‘specialization’ equilibrium or ‘pure 
fraud’ equilibrium may emerge. 
Proof: Utility of a deviating physician (i.e., GP) at ‘pure fraud’ equilibrium is a decreasing 
function with case mix in a clinic sv . The higher sv  is, the less rent a deviating physician can get 
(i.e., see Proposition 1). Given equilibrium price )(' cgcgcgcg Ttxp  , utility of a deviating 



















   
*u   denotes the maximum level of utility a physician can get after deviating to be a GP. 
cg
m is 




p . Above inequality holds 
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by assumption.  From equilibrium condition of ‘specialization’ and ‘pure fraud’ equilibrium (1.13) 
and (1.22), for the same sets of parameter values, the case mix sv  is smaller in ‘specialization’ 
equilibrium than ‘pure fraud’ equilibrium v.   
 
In other words, for some parameter values, it may not be profitable for a physician to be a GP 
under ‘pure fraud’ equilibrium ( 0 , *u = u ). However, if time sequence is reversed, say a 
‘specialization’ equilibrium may emerge at the first place. In this case, the case mix in a non-GP 




 . With some parameters,  existing small enough  , which 
satisfying *u =u  ，both ‘fraud’ and ’specialization’ equilibrium may emerge . In detail, if 










cgvm   , 
Both equilibriums can emerge. First inequality implies that welfare improvement is at least  . In 
this case, physician has incentive be a GP if he can get at least the reservation utility under 
‘specialization’ equilibrium.  
 
In this case, if status quo is ‘specialization’ equilibrium, ‘specialization’ equilibrium is stable; if 
status quo is ‘pure fraud’ equilibrium, ‘pure fraud’ equilibrium is stable as well since a deviating 
physician’s utility (i.e., GP) is less than the reservation utility. Hence, both ‘pure fraud’ and 
‘specialization’ equilibrium may happen even for the same set of parameters. Q.E.D. 
 
Proposition 2: There is welfare loss under ‘specialization’ equilibrium compared with welfare 
under full information case.  
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Proof: After comparing welfare with the full information case, incremental social costs between 























   (A3) 
where ]1,0[m . Variables with superscript * denote the optimal choice variables under full 
information. Hence, under a ‘specialization’ equilibrium, the total social cost increases compared 
with the full information case. The first item of (A3) denotes the additional switching cost under a 
‘specialization’ equilibrium, which is always positive. The second item of (A3) denotes additional 
resources transferred to physicians in the private sector. The third item denotes changes of 
resources spent in the hospital.  
 
The first inequality of (A3) holds when the third item in (A3) is positive. This item can be 
arranged into: 
 0)}('{)}('))1(({ ******  TtxpvTtvtvxpv hbhbcgshbshgshbcbs     
The item within the first brackets denotes social costs to treat sv  serious cases in a clinic and 
sv mild cases together with 1- sv serious cases in the hospital. The item within second brackets 
denotes the social costs when the hospital treats one serious case and clinics treat sv  serious cases. 
Here, hbhghb ttx ,, are optimal inputs in ‘specialization’ equilibrium when the hospital is going to 
treat sv  mild cases.  
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If it is more efficient to treat a serious case in the hospital than in a clinic, resources required to 
treat a serious case in the hospital and a mild case in clinic are always less than resources required 
to treat a mild case in the hospital and a serious case in a clinic (i.e., swapping treatment location). 
Hence, the above inequality holds. Therefore, the welfare under ‘specialization‘ equilibrium is 
less than the full information case. Furthermore, ‘pure fraud’ equilibrium is a special case of 
‘specialization’ equilibrium when m=0.  Therefore, from (A3), social welfare under ‘pure 
fraud‘ equilibrium is less than full information case. Q.E.D. 
 
4.4.4: Comparative statics 
Substituting (1.19), (1.21), (1.22) into (1.18), if time input for diagnosis d  is low enough, we can 













1 , the denominator for the above 
m
is negative. This implies that if the specialization 
level is small enough, the specialization level will decrease with the switching cost. This is 






 is positive. Price difference between non-GP and GP clinic will increase with m. 




1 ,  effect of changing price gap 
will offset the effect of switching cost. Hence, at equilibrium, the level of specialization will 
increase. Therefore, if the switching cost decreases (e.g., such as upgrading information system), 
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.  The sign of the 
 sv
 also 




1 , we have 
 sv
>0. This implies that more mild cases will be treated in the hospital with 













   





ttt . In other 
words, we consider the case where the expected time input for individual inputs decreases with 







Now, we can look at the planner’s policy responses to parameters. We have other comparative 



























These results imply that fewer physicians will be employed if the switching cost is higher, 
provided the level of specialization is low enough. This is because more mild cases will be treated 
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in the hospital with higher switching costs. Planner will anticipate this and require the individual 
physician to treat more patients for a given salary, provided that the reservation utility of 
physicians can be fulfilled. Hence, fewer physicians will be hired in the hospital. However, if the 




1 , more physicians will be 
hired since more serious cases are intended to be treated in the hospital. We can also show the 
sign for comparative statics on H,   and u  remains the same as full information case. 
 









































1 ). Therefore, there will be fewer GPs and more non-GP physicians in the 
local market. Interestingly, with a higher switching cost  , the expected time input per hospital 
patient is shorter since more mild cases will be treated in the hospital. Then, each physician will 
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treat more cases for a given salary. Since the capacity for the hospital is fixed, there will be fewer 
hospital physicians. 
 
Appendix for Chapter 3: 
Table A1: Total healthcare expenditure in China (Billion Yuan) 
 1980 1990 1995 2000 2003 2004 2005 
Total 
expenditure 
14.32 74.74 215.51 458.66 658.41 759.03 865.99 
Percentage 
of GDP (%) 
3.17 4.03 3.54 4.62 4.85 4.75 4.73 
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Table A2: Income and Expenditure of General Hospitals of Health Sector in 2006 
 Total Hospital of MOH County Hospital 
Income Per Hospital 
(in million Yuan)  
61.64 886.40 21.91 
   of which: Drug  
   income 
   (in million Yuan) 
25.59 372.85 8.77 
Average Medical 
Expenses per out 
patients (yuan) 
128.7 251.5 84.7 
of which: for       
Drugs(yuan) 




4668.9 12434.2 2241.3 
of which: for  
Drugs (yuan) 
1992.0 4909.1 993.3 
of which for  
Examination &  
Treatment   
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1995 1667.8 880.3 30.4 
2000 3083.7 1421.9 46.1 
2004 4284.8 1872.9 43.7 
2005 4661.5 2045.6 43.9 
2006 4668.9 1992.0 42.7 
 
 
Table A4: Per Capita Health Expenditure in Urban and Rural Area (in Yuan per year) 
 
 1990 1995 2000 2003 2004 2005 
Urban areas  158.8 401.3 828.6 1108.9 1261.9 1122.8 
Rural areas 38.8 112.2 209.4 274.7 301.6 318.5 
Consumer Price 
Index(1990=100) 
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Table A5: Amount of medical care and Utilization of Beds in Hospitals and 
Township Health Centers by Region in 2006 
 




72.4 77.2 68.3 69.0 
Average Stay  
Days 
10.9 11.2 10.7 10.5 
Township Health Center 
Utilization  
Rate (%) 
39.4 40.2 39.9 37.7 
Average Stay  
Days 
4.6 5.2 4.3 4.3 















                                                                                              177 
 
Table A6: Management and features of four rural health insurance projects: 
 RMHC* Health VIII** CASS in 
Shanxi 
province*** 






village level  
County 




Township government  
Who monitors 
the fund 











Is the plan 
voluntary?  
Voluntary     
  
Voluntary       Voluntary  Voluntary, but with 
“mobilization” from 
local governments  
Level of risk 
pooling 








30% at village 
level and 35% 
at township 
level and 40% 
at county level 
N/A Not much difference 
between 
township/village level 
providers, 60-70% in 
practice 
Inpatient co-





30% at village 
level and 35% 
at township 
level and 40% 
at county level 
N/A 76% on average  
Deductible      No 
Deductible  
N/A N/A Various deductibles 

















N/A  N/A 1,500-2,500RMB    
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Table A7: Supply side interventions in three rural health insurance projects:  
 RMHC*    Health VIII**  CMS in 
Yunnan province**** 




sharing on drug 
management 
Standardized procedures 
of treatment /Essential 
drug list  
Bulk purchasing of 
drugs/ information 
sharing on drug 
procurement/regulation 











Training of doctors, 
standardized procedures 
for diagnosis and 
treatment  
N/A 
Referral system From low to 
high 
level provider 
In both directions: from 
low to high level 
provider and from high to 
low level provider 
From low to higher 
level provider 











*Rural Mutual Health Care, by Harvard research team; Hsiao (2004), Yip (2006),  
** World Bank Health VIII project; Wagstaff (2007), China Development Brief (2003), 
*** Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Department for international development, UK and 
Amity foundation, HK in Shanxi Province (Cai 2007). 
****CMS project survey in Yunan province, China; Chap 6, 7 in Gu, et al. (2006) 
